Illegal Immigrant Shoots Gun, Claims he's Protected by the Second Amendment

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Interesting. Thoughts?




http://dailycaller.com/2018/08/02/illegal-immigrant-gun-second-amendment/



ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT SHOOTS GUN, CLAIMS HE’S PROTECTED BY THE SECOND AMENDMENT

7:20 PM 08/02/2018

An illegal alien is claiming that his right to self-defense is protected under the Second Amendment of the constitution.

Javier Perez, a Mexican national, was charged after he fired a round into the air in Brooklyn in order to ward off rival gang members in 2016, reported The New York Daily News. Perez is now claiming in a Brooklyn federal court that his right to bear arms is guaranteed under the constitution despite not being a United States citizen.



 
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Regardless of citizenship this case has wider ramifications. He was in New York, no permit, no permission to possess a handgun under the circumstances at all.
 
Who knows, but it might be disturbing to the anti-gun crowd. Most appear to hate guns but love illegals.
Here's an article on the 7th circuit and the right of illegals to have a gun....
https://immigrationreform.com/2015/...second-amendment-right-to-keep-and-bear-arms/

Geez, they really screwed that up. Let's see what the real story is.

The Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 7th Circuit, No. 14-3271 (2015) was discussed in this thread.

I explained the decision in this post:
...

First, there nothing really new here. There are other cases in which courts have concluded that even illegal aliens can, under some circumstances, be entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights. And there have been other court decisions which have upheld various of the factors enumerated in 18 USC 922(g) disqualifying one from possessing a gun or ammunition.

Background

As the 7th Circuit in its opinion outlined the background of the case (slip op., at 1 -- 2):
When Mariano Meza-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in August 2013, he was carrying a .22 caliber cartridge. But it was what he did not have— documentation showing that he is lawfully in the United States—that concerns us now. His immigration status made his possession of the cartridge a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), which prohibits foreigners who are not entitled to be in the United States (whom we will call “unauthorized aliens”) from possessing firearms. Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment that followed, arguing that § 922(g)(5) impermissibly infringed on his rights under the Second Amendment to the Constitution. The district court denied his motion on the broad ground that the Second Amendment does not protect unauthorized aliens. That rationale swept too far, and we do not endorse it. The court’s judgment, however, was correct for a different reason: the Second Amendment does not preclude certain restrictions on the right to bear arms, including the one imposed by§ 922(g)(5)....

Questions on Appeal

Meza-Rodriguez' appeal of the District Court's refusal to dismiss his indictment potentially raises two questions: (1) do the rights protected by the Second Amendment extend to unauthorized aliens (using the terminology of the Circuit Court); and (2) if so, is prohibiting unauthorized aliens from possessing a gun or ammunition a constitutionally impermissible regulation of the rights protected by the Second Amendment?

To respond to and rule on Meza-Rodriguez' appeal, the Circuit Court needed to address both those questions.

Do the Rights Protected by the Second Amendment Extend to Unauthorized Aliens?

The Circuit Court did not comprehensively answer that question. Rather it concluded that the rights protected by the Second Amendment extended to Meza-Rodriguez, and unauthorized aliens similarly situated. To reach that conclusion, the Circuit Court looked at other cases extending under some circumstances certain rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to unauthorized aliens.

As the 7th Circuit noted (Meza-Rodriguez, slip op. at 9 -- 10, emphasis added):
...The conclusion that the term “the people” in the Second Amendment has the same meaning as it carries in other parts of the Bill of Rights is just the first step in our analysis. We still must decide what it means. The Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, albeit obliquely. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not protect a noncitizen brought involuntarily to the United States against a warrantless search of his foreign residence. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274–75. In rejecting Verdugo-Urquidez’s position, the Court stated that “‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” Id. at 265. Of interest here, the Court also said that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.” Id. at 271. ...

And with regard to Meza-Rodriguez' ties to the United States, the 7th Circuit notes (Meza-Rodriguez,slip op at 11):
...see first that Meza-Rodriguez was in the United States voluntarily; there is no debate on this point. He still has extensive ties with this country, having resided here from the time he arrived over 20 years ago at the age of four or five until his removal. He attended public schools in Milwaukee, developed close relationships with family members and other acquaintances, and worked (though sporadically) at various locations. This is much more than the connections our sister circuits have found to be adequate.....

Thus the rights protected by the Second Amendment extend to Meza-Rodriguez.

Is Prohibiting Unauthorized Aliens from Possessing a Gun or Ammunition a Constitutionally Impermissible Regulation of the Rights Protected by the Second Amendment?

And with regard to that question, the 7th Circuit concluded the disqualifying unauthorized aliens from possessing a gun or ammunition was a permissible regulation.

In sustaining the application of 18 USC 922(g)(5), the 7th Circuit found (slip op., at 15):
...Congress’s objective in passing § 922(g) was “to keep guns out of the hands of presumptively risky people” and to “suppress[] armed violence.” Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683–84 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)); see also Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1169–70 (§ 922(g)’s purposes are to assist law enforcement in combating crime and to keep weapons away from those deemed dangerous or irresponsible). One such group includes aliens “who … [are] illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). The government argues that the ban on the possession of firearms by this group of people is substantially related to the statute’s general objectives because such persons are able purposefully to evade detection by law enforcement. We agree with this position: unauthorized noncitizens often live “largely outside the formal system of registration, employment, and identification, [and] are harder to trace and more likely to assume a false identity.” Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1170. Persons with a strong incentive to use false identification papers will be more difficult to keep tabs on than the general population. (Section 922(g)(5)(B)’s prohibition on firearms possession by most aliens who are lawfully present but who hold only nonimmigrant visas reflects a similar concern....

Discussion

Basically, the 7th Circuit could not resolve this case by refusing to extend the rights protected by the Second Amendment to unauthorized aliens. Were it to do so, it would have undercut existing and important legal principles extending certain fundamental, personal rights to persons who , "...have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country...."

However, several of the conditions listed in 18 USC 922(g) disqualifying one from possessing a gun or ammunition have been sustained at the Circuit Court level.

If this case were to go up to the Supreme Court the arguments would focus on the disqualifying condition and whether it passes the applicable level of scrutiny.

So the bottom line is that whether or not the Second Amendment applies to illegal immigrants, an illegal alien is prohibited under 18 USC 922(g)(5) from possessing a gun or ammunition; and 18 USC 922(g)(5) is constitutional, at least in the Seventh Circuit.

I doubt that Mr. Perez will get a better reception in the Second Circuit than
Meza-Rodriguez received in the Seventh Circuit. So whether or not Mr. Perez has the protection of the Second Amendment, he is still a prohibited person in possession of a gun in violation of 18 USC 922(g).
 
I didn't think the 2nd Amendment granted rights, but prohibited infringement. It's not the government bestowing rights on the people, but the people restricting the power of the goverment. Does that restriction preclude the government from infringing on the rights of those convicted of certain crimes? It would seem the answer has been no. Does it restrict the government from infringing upon the rights of non-US persons? The government has certainly made an effort in that area. Whether it is lawful or not appears to be the subject of debate. Should the government also have the authority to infringe on non-resident alien's freedom of speech?
 
Isn't firing a gun "into the air" a particularly poor idea in the eyes of the law? If he didn't shoot an attacker wouldn't this be evidence he really wasn't in danger?
I'm not sure what the law really is --- and there might be details we don't know about --- but I'm guessing this person' s legal problems could theoretically stem from what he did at the scene, rather than a second amendment issue.
 
I didn't think the 2nd Amendment granted rights, but prohibited infringement. ...
In the real world that's a distinction without a difference, i. e., it really doesn't mean anything.

But I'll interrupt this discussion for a basic lesson in how things work.

I. The Relationship Between State and Federal Law

  • Our's is a federal system. States are sovereign, political entities. At the time of the founding of our nation each State or Commonwealth effectively ceded some measure of sovereignty to join with the others to become the United States. How much sovereignty each would cede was a central issue in hashing out the Constitution. Our nation would not have come into existence had the States/Commonwealths not retained an acceptable degree of sovereignty.

  • A fundamental attribute of government is what's known as police power:
    The inherent authority of a government to impose restrictions on private rights for the sake of public welfare, order, and security.

  • The police powers of States are broad and general.

  • However, as our federal government has been established under the Constitution the federal government has no general police powers. Instead, its powers are specifically described in the Constitution. So, for example, Congress only has the power to pass laws consistent with the specific powers granted to it under Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution (subject to certain limitations set out in Section 9 of Article I).

  • That arrangement is acknowledged by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
    The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

  • Deciding whether a law or other act of the federal government is within its power.

    1. The first issue will be whether a law or act of the federal government is within a power granted to it by the Constitution. So for example, the scope of the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to pass laws regulating marijuana has been defined and confirmed under a number of Supreme Court decisions, most recently Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).

    2. A second issue will be whether a particular federal law impairs rights protected under the Bill of Rights. However, the courts have ruled that some regulation of rights protected by the Bill of Rights is permissible.

    3. The Founding Fathers assigned to the federal courts the authority to decide what the Constitution means and how it applies to matters in controversy (Constitution, Article III, Sections 1 and 2):
      Section 1.

      The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. ...​

      Section 2.

      The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,...​

  • Deciding whether a law or other act of a state government is within its power.

    1. While the police powers of a State are general and broad, each State/Commonwealth has its own constitution. A State's constitution may circumscribe powers of the State government and provide explicit protection of some rights.

    2. Since in the United States each State or Commonwealth has its own government in the form of a representative democracy, the people in each have the opportunity to influence what laws are adopted and how they are implemented.

    3. While the Supreme Court ruled in 1833 that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the States (Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)), some years following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the doctrine evolved of applying some, but not all, of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the States on a piecemeal basis, using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus those enumerated rights found applicable to the State have also become limiting factor on the exercise by States of their police power.

    4. To the extent that the question of the validity of a state law raises an issue under the United States Constitution, the meaning and application of the Constitution is finally a matter to be decided by the federal courts.

  • What about when there's federal law and state law on the same subject?

    1. The whole area of choice of law (where the laws of multiple jurisdictions could be applicable) is a huge, complex, and pretty much non-intuitive subject.

    2. In general federal law will supercede state law. See The Constitution of the United States, Article VI, Clause 2:
      This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

    3. If the particular issue addressed by the state law is also addressed by the federal law, there's the question of whether the particular federal law was intended to "occupy the field", i. e., be the final word on the subject. In that case the federal law preempts the state law and applies instead of the state law.

    4. On the other hand, if a court decides that the federal law did not reflect an intent to occupy the field, in order to decide if federal law or state law applies a court will need to decide if the state law is consistent a federal policy concern or would, on the other hand, frustrate the federal policy furthered by the law. Or a federal law could be found to preempt state law if either expressly or by inference the federal law was intended to promote national uniformity with regard to a particular issue.

    5. Sometimes federal law will be explicit about how a conflict between federal law and state law is to be resolved. An example which comes immediately to mind involves the confidentiality of medical information regulation under HIPAA. Those regulations expressly provide that they don't supersede state laws to the extent providing greater protection of an individual's confidentiality interests. For another example, with regard to firearms regulation, federal law (the Gun Control Act of 1968) expressly doesn't preempt state laws. See 18 USC 927:
      No provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.

    6. Sometimes there's no conflict between federal and state laws. If something is a crime under federal law but not state law, the crime would be prosecuted by the federal government, and visa versa. An act that is both a federal and state crime can be prosecuted by either, or both, the state and federal governments.

II. Regulation of Constitutionally Protected Rights.

  • In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008) the Supreme Court found that the Second Amendment protected an individual right; and it applied the Second Amendment to the States in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Therefore the citizens of every State are entitled to enjoy the RKBA to the extent required by the Constitution, and any regulation by the federal government or a State of the RKBA must be limited in a manner which will pass constitutional muster. The uncertainty here is that Second Amendment jurisprudence is at its formative stage, and therefore the constitutional limits to the regulation of the RKBA are not at present well defined.

  • Even though the Second Amendment now (since Heller and McDonald) is a limit on federal and State power to regulate the RKBA, it's well settled law that under certain circumstance and to some extent a constitutionally protected right may be regulated. What those circumstance might be and the nature and extent of permissible regulation will be worked out by the courts. To do so, a court will consider, among other things, the nature of the right, the nature of the regulation, and the governmental purpose intended to be served.

  • For the purposes of illustration, let's consider the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment. While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, assembly and religion against laws that abridge those rights we know there has been a history of certain regulation of speech, assembly and religion. A few examples are:

    1. Various laws (both state and federal) prohibiting such things as false advertising, fraud or misrepresentation. There are also state and federal laws requiring certain disclosures in connection with various transactions, which are valid and routinely enforced even though such laws do impinge on the freedom of speech.

    2. If you are offering securities or certain other types of investments to the public, your written solicitation materials will have to first be approved prior to use by one or more regulatory agencies. If you are selling medicines in interstate commerce, your labeling will have to be approved in advance by the FDA, and you will have to have demonstrated, through hard, scientific data, that any claims or representations made are true. These are also laws that abridge freedom of speech, and yet they are regularly enforced.

    3. Laws respecting the time, place and manner of speech or assembly have also survived Constitutional challenges. Thus a municipality may require that organizers obtain a permit in order to hold an assembly or a parade and may prohibit such activities during, for example, the very early morning hours. Such regulations would be permitted only to the extent necessary to serve the compelling state interest of protecting public health and safety. Any such regulations, to be constitutionally permissible, could not consider the content of the speech or assembly; and they would need to be applied in an even handed manner based on set guidelines and not subject to the discretion of a public official. See, for example:

      • Hill v Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), in which the Court, in upholding a Colorado law restricting protesting, educational or counseling activities within 100 feet of the entrance to a health facility, noted:
        ...We are likewise persuaded that the statute is "narrowly tailored" to serve those interests and that it leaves open ample alternative channels for communication. As we have emphasized on more than one occasion, when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement...

        • Cf. McCullen v. Coakley (U. S. Supreme Court, No. 12–1168, 2014)


        • In McCullen the Court struck down a new Massachusetts "buffer zone" law. As noted in the opinion the Court had previously sustained a different sort of buffer zone law in Colorado, and nothing in McCullen casts any doubt on the continued validity of the Colorado law (McCullen, slip opinion at 2):
          ….The statute [the prior Massachusetts law] was modeled on a similar Colorado law that this Court had upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703 (2000). Relying on Hill, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the Massachusetts statute against a First Amendment challenge. McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F. 3d 45 (2004) (McGuire II), cert. denied, 544 U. S. 974 (2005); McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F. 3d 36 (2001) (McGuire I).

          By 2007, some Massachusetts legislators and law enforcement officials had come to regard the 2000 statute as inadequate.....

      • Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir., 2006) in which the court upheld a Santa Monica ordinance requiring a permit for public assemblies. In fact in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs the court specifically acknowledges that the ordinance may burden the protected right, noting, at pg 1038:
        ...A narrowly-tailored permitting regulation need not be the least restrictive means of furthering a locality's asserted interests. The regulation may not,
        however, burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve a scheme's important goals. See United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir.1999). "[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied `so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'" Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985))...

    4. In the leading case on prior restraint (Near v. State of Minnesota, Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931)) the Court in striking down a Minnesota statute allowing for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of malicious, scandalous and defamatory news analyzed in considerable detail and depth the scope and extent of the infringement of the freedom of press, the interests served and the availability of other and narrower remedies. And the Court then reached the conclusion that the statute went too far to be a permissible regulation.

      But nonetheless the Court also noted that certain interests, under certain circumstances would justify even prior restraint (Near, 283 U. S. 657, at 715 - 716):
      ...The objection has also been made that the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. 'When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its error that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.' Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. Ed. 470. No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.6 On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 139, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874.' Schenck v. United States, supra. These limitations are not applicable here. Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the extent of authority to prevent publications in order to protect private rights according to the principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of equity...

    5. In the past, laws prohibiting polygamy have been upheld against challenges that they violate the right to free exercise of religion (Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890)).

  • So in fact the reality is that rights protected by the Constitution may nonetheless be subject to some limited regulation. The foregoing discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence serves the limited purpose of demonstrating that the courts do permit limited regulation of a constitutionally protected right. There are numerous examples of laws sustained by the courts which abridge freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. And First Amendment jurisprudence also offers some clues as to how such regulations will be evaluated by the courts.

  • We can not expect, nor will we see, perfect correspondence between the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment and the regulation of rights protected by the Second Amendment. First Amendment jurisprudence is quite mature at this point, but Second Amendment jurisprudence, in the wake of Heller, is in its infancy. However, we can expect some regulation of Second Amendment rights to be upheld by the courts.
 
As far as I’m concerned, it’s made pretty clear in the opening paragraph of the Constitution, the part that way too many people omit: “We the People OF THE UNITED STATES.”

Your quote identifies those collectively represented by the constitutional convention delegates. It is not intended to limit the scope of the ideas and inalienable rights enshrined therein. The Declaration was pretty clear about the founders' intent (issues of slavery, suffrage, etc notwithstanding): We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal..."
 
Well, the intent of the document penned by the Founding Fathers was to recognize an universal human right, and in describing it as "inalienable," it's inherent precisely by being human. IE if you are sentient with the correct DNA you qualify.

It does not protect a chimpanzee wielding a loaded AK on full auto.

We can quibble about jurisdictional needs and enforcement but the basic right exists. Like it or not. Infringing on it is the issue. Don't forget we exploit that right and have done so by shipping arms to the suppressed in other countries, extending the concept into other sovereign nations, even against their collective will.

I think it would do good to pursue that interpretation - that even an illegal immigrant - technically an unconvicted criminal - shares the same rights we do. We have the right to keep and bear arms as long as we are not convicted of illegality. It's an absolute.

Same as the freedom of speech.

That does not directly transfer to being able to vote, however.

The political results might be something one group or another may not like but they get to deal with it. What would happen if we suddenly got an influx of native Europeans who were prone to firearms ownership?

I bet the political overtones of that situation would be dramatically different. BTW, don't forget that is exactly how we started ...

We don't get to pick and choose, but our opponents have no qualms about it.
 
I’m no legal scholar, but I think if I (a citizen) stood pretty much anywhere in Brooklyn and shot a gun in the air I would be braking some law or another. I don’t think I would be protected by the second amendment. I think I would be arrested.
 
Uhm, pretty sure GCA '68 requires firearm possessors to be citizens, or immigrants on a path to citizenship.

If citizenship is not required constitutionally, then GCA will need some editing. Once that door is open, how wide will it be so?

Citizens or legal residents. Considering he was apparently an illegal immigrant, then it certainly wasn't legal. However, a foreign national does NOT have to be on a path to citizenship to own a firearm in the USA.

As far as I’m concerned, it’s made pretty clear in the opening paragraph of the Constitution, the part that way too many people omit: “We the People OF THE UNITED STATES.”

Oh, come on now, don't go down that road or you'll be no better than the dems. Does the Right of Free Speech only apply to citizens? Should we round up any foreigner and prosecute them for... who knows what, just because they aren't a citizen? Or how about protection against illegal search and seizure? Does a foreigner deserve to be denied due process and trial by jury?

Regardless of how illegal his actions were, he does have a point that the Bill of Rights doesn't specify that one must be a citizen of the US to enjoy said basic rights. And that is exactly how it should be.
 
There are two things at play here:

1) Who enjoys rights, and
2) Is there a valid rights claim in this incident.

Now that Frank has moved this to Legal I am sure that only #2 is open for discussion.
 
However, a foreign national does NOT have to be on a path to citizenship to own a firearm in the USA.
Fair enough. 18 USC 922(g) does provide:
(5) who, being an alien
(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or
(B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)));

However that (5)(A) still seems to stand in the way of the ruling.
Or, if it does not, then what else in 18 USC 922 can we examine as unconstitutional?

(The question of whether the penumbra of either Constitutional or Common Law rights automatically applies within US borders is far, far deeper one, and not germane here.)
 
Some off-topic posts have been deleted. Please remember the Guidelines for the Legal Forum:
... The Legal Forum is for the discussion of the law as it is and how the law actually applies in RKBA matters, not the way we think things should be or the way we wish they were. Comments and opinions should be based on legal principles and supported where appropriate with reference to legal authority, including court decisions, statutes and scholarly articles....
 
The Supreme court has ruled at least once that the Bill of Rights applies to the citizens of the US. I likely have the spelling wrong but I believe it was Virdugio v. US.

People seem to be confusing the Declaration of Independence with the Constitution as usual when speaking of rights.

-kBob
 
The Supreme court has ruled at least once that the Bill of Rights applies to the citizens of the US. I likely have the spelling wrong but I believe it was Virdugio v. US.....

Not true.

First, the case was United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).

Second, what that case decided (as analyzed in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 7th Circuit, No. 14-3271 (2015), slip op., at 9-10) was:
...The conclusion that the term “the people” in the Second Amendment has the same meaning as it carries in other parts of the Bill of Rights is just the first step in our analysis. We still must decide what it means.The Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, albeit obliquely. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not protect a noncitizen brought involuntarily to the United States against a warrantless search of his foreign residence. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274–75. In rejecting Verdugo- Urquidez’s position, the Court stated that “‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” Id. at 265. Of interest here, the Court also said that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.” Id. at 271. It then contrasted Verdugo-Urquidez with the unauthorized immigrants with whom it had dealt in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). Unlike Verdugo-Urquidez, the latter “were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations.” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273.

At a minimum, Verdugo-Urquidez governs the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to noncitizens. For Fourth Amendment rights to attach, the alien must show “substantial connections” with the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2008) (noncitizen who was in the country involuntarily and lacked significant previous voluntary connection with the United States could not rely on the Fourth Amendment);...
 
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