I bought "Shooter" (ISBN-0-312-33685-1) at a used bookstore yesterday and read it all by about 12:30 this morning.
Including the Epilogue, it's 293 pages.
Here's what you get in this book about and partially by Gunnery Sgt Jack Coughlin and mostly by Donald A. Davis.
You get a bit about his life, a sub-plot about his divorce woven into the story, classic combat buddy stories, a bit about an incompetent officer, and whole lot of shooting and whacking in Iraq. There's a little bit of shooting in Mogadishu, but mostly in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
His buddy was the guy who had the old-style Iraqi flag that was put over the face of the Saddam statue right after the American flag at Firdos Square.
Coughlin and his buddy were also some of the first US troops interviewed right after that statue came down.
Here's what you don't get.
If you are looking to learn anything about the actual nuts and bolts of sniping, forget it.
This book is for laymen, and written as such. You will not get anything at all about ballistics or mil dot ranging formulas or how to read wind, or anything at all remotely technical.
One thing you will learn is something you probably already know.......that the US military is always preparing to fight the last war, not the next war.
Coughlin speaks to his idea of Mobile Sniper Strike Teams, which he actually got to put into use in Iraq mostly due to a whole chain of accidents and misfortunes of war.
Coughlin points out that at the beginning of the Iraq war, US sniper doctrine was essentially that from the Vietnam war.....snipers hiding in holes, snipers never exposing themselves to enemy fire, snipers doing mostly recon and a little shooting, snipers measuring their progress in inches, not yards.
Coughlin was really hacked off that the big brass think-tank types saw snipers as "support troops" with very limited use on a modern battlefield, and did everything he could to change their minds.
In Iraq, Coughlin put snipers on wheels. He figured out a way to build a prone position atop a Humvee, and basically was a sniper who could travel at 60 mph and who could go anywhere he was needed.
He even shot from the hood of the Humvee, breaking all sniper rules about concealment and not exposing himself to fire.
In the final assault on Baghdad, he assembled his Mobile Sniper Strike Team and they would race ahead of the main assault, usually with only enough Marine riflemen with them to secure the ground floor of a building.
The Marine riflemen would clear and secure the building, and then Coughlin and his snipers would race to the roof, set up, and whack every single bad guy they could put a scope on. When the main body of armor reached a point near their position, they would race out of the building, jump back into their vehicles, and roar ahead again.
They were not slow, stealthy or camoflagued. They did not stalk and wait for hours and hours to take one well-placed shot at one high-value target. They were fast, aggressive, out on the edge, and they shot a whole bunch, usually hitting and killing whomever they shot at.
They were "sniping" in almost an exaggerated designated marksman role ut ahead of the main attack, not assigned to a rifle squad, and they were a lot more precise and accurate than a designated marksman ever would be.
To be honest, his idea didn't strike me as "revolutionary" (pardon the approaching unintentional pun) because this type of use of skilled marskmen saw lots and lots of use during the American Revolution......riflemen either out ahead of the main body, or on the sides, whacking British officers and every other target of opportunity they could put a front sight on.
But the effect on the enemy caused by skilled riflemen who can kill from what seem unreal distances was the same on the Baathists and fedayeen as it was on the British in the late 1770s....whole units were paralyzed, confusion and fear took control, widespread demoralization seeped into every hole.
Funny, ain't it? There really isn't anything new under the sun.
But, an overall good read. Check it out.
hillbilly
Including the Epilogue, it's 293 pages.
Here's what you get in this book about and partially by Gunnery Sgt Jack Coughlin and mostly by Donald A. Davis.
You get a bit about his life, a sub-plot about his divorce woven into the story, classic combat buddy stories, a bit about an incompetent officer, and whole lot of shooting and whacking in Iraq. There's a little bit of shooting in Mogadishu, but mostly in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
His buddy was the guy who had the old-style Iraqi flag that was put over the face of the Saddam statue right after the American flag at Firdos Square.
Coughlin and his buddy were also some of the first US troops interviewed right after that statue came down.
Here's what you don't get.
If you are looking to learn anything about the actual nuts and bolts of sniping, forget it.
This book is for laymen, and written as such. You will not get anything at all about ballistics or mil dot ranging formulas or how to read wind, or anything at all remotely technical.
One thing you will learn is something you probably already know.......that the US military is always preparing to fight the last war, not the next war.
Coughlin speaks to his idea of Mobile Sniper Strike Teams, which he actually got to put into use in Iraq mostly due to a whole chain of accidents and misfortunes of war.
Coughlin points out that at the beginning of the Iraq war, US sniper doctrine was essentially that from the Vietnam war.....snipers hiding in holes, snipers never exposing themselves to enemy fire, snipers doing mostly recon and a little shooting, snipers measuring their progress in inches, not yards.
Coughlin was really hacked off that the big brass think-tank types saw snipers as "support troops" with very limited use on a modern battlefield, and did everything he could to change their minds.
In Iraq, Coughlin put snipers on wheels. He figured out a way to build a prone position atop a Humvee, and basically was a sniper who could travel at 60 mph and who could go anywhere he was needed.
He even shot from the hood of the Humvee, breaking all sniper rules about concealment and not exposing himself to fire.
In the final assault on Baghdad, he assembled his Mobile Sniper Strike Team and they would race ahead of the main assault, usually with only enough Marine riflemen with them to secure the ground floor of a building.
The Marine riflemen would clear and secure the building, and then Coughlin and his snipers would race to the roof, set up, and whack every single bad guy they could put a scope on. When the main body of armor reached a point near their position, they would race out of the building, jump back into their vehicles, and roar ahead again.
They were not slow, stealthy or camoflagued. They did not stalk and wait for hours and hours to take one well-placed shot at one high-value target. They were fast, aggressive, out on the edge, and they shot a whole bunch, usually hitting and killing whomever they shot at.
They were "sniping" in almost an exaggerated designated marksman role ut ahead of the main attack, not assigned to a rifle squad, and they were a lot more precise and accurate than a designated marksman ever would be.
To be honest, his idea didn't strike me as "revolutionary" (pardon the approaching unintentional pun) because this type of use of skilled marskmen saw lots and lots of use during the American Revolution......riflemen either out ahead of the main body, or on the sides, whacking British officers and every other target of opportunity they could put a front sight on.
But the effect on the enemy caused by skilled riflemen who can kill from what seem unreal distances was the same on the Baathists and fedayeen as it was on the British in the late 1770s....whole units were paralyzed, confusion and fear took control, widespread demoralization seeped into every hole.
Funny, ain't it? There really isn't anything new under the sun.
But, an overall good read. Check it out.
hillbilly
