It is pretty obvious that fiddletown and I (and maybe fiddletown and woody) are speaking past each other. Maybe this will provide fiddletown with some necessary insights.
First, the use of rights in the Constitution and the use of rights in law are distinct on many grounds. The bill of rights addressed rights held by the people when the Constitution was drafted and supposedly well understood at that time. The Constitution prohibits in various ways government from infringing on these rights. In order to legally do away with any of these rights, at minimum, the Constitution should be amended.
There is some question whether even an amendment would suffice since the some of these rights are "inalienable". Amending such a right out of the Constitution would only permit the right to be infringed, not eliminated. I suspect that fiddletown regards this last statement is distinction without a difference, but woody and I wouldn't.
Rights defined in law are different. They may be altered by an act of the legislature or a decision by the Courts. Your right to be given
a Miranda warning when arrested isn't in the Constitution and isn't protected by that document. This legal right can be extinguished by another case decided by the Supreme Court.
But saying an artificial person, a corporation, has a first Amendment right to speech must be wrong. I'm willing to be convinced to the contrary if anyone can show me a single instance of any founder writing of an intent to extend bill of rights protection to artificial entities. fiddletown points to the lack of limits on speech to deduce that it applies to any entity capable of speech (anyone for protecting the right of speech by parrots?). I think this fails unless fiddletown can present a common understanding written by the founders that the rights presented in the bill of rights applied also to non-natural persons (e.g., parrots, corporations, . . . ). Show me a single example of a founder writing that speech would be protected even for natural persons who were slaves or any other entity considered in the Constitution as property.
Now, one difference between fiddletown and I (and, I guess, fiddletown and woody) seems to be along the lines of
a theory of an extensible Constitution. If, it seems that a right was left out of the Constitution, fiddletown seems to believe it can be added by act of the legislature or by a Court decision. So, the US Supreme Court says corporations have a first amendment right to speech means that it is a right protected by the Constitution. Really, such a right from an extension of the Constitution is a right protected only by legal inertia.
I believe it to be sloppy thinking (lacking precision) to assert that rights obtain by the extensible Constitution are Constitutional rights. BTW, that isn't to say that we don't have other rights to be discovered under the Ninth Amendment. But, if a Court wishes to assert under the Ninth Amendment that artificial entities have some of the rights of natural persons, they should invoke the Ninth Amendment in their conclusion and explain better than they have in the cases cited by fiddletown.
Again, I await a real education pointing to any writing by a founder saying corporations have protected rights in the Constitution.
We know that the US Supreme Court makes mistakes and misstates cases -- otherwise how do you justify Brown v Board and the selective overturning by the Court of its prior holdings in U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 , 553.
Amar, in a
recent paper, makes a point in his discussion of the obligation of the Supreme Court to "follow the Constitution, not . . . [a prior] case" if the Court thinks the prior case was decided from less understanding of the Constitution than available today. Put it simply, the Constitution is the core law and precedent Court cases (or legislative acts) can be overturned.
So, what fiddletown describes as "rights", for the most part, are rights protected by legal inertia in the extensible Constitution that he cites. Yet, he immediately cites cases where courts are infringing or regulating these rights as justification that the rights of a natural person may similarly be infringed. That is wrong.
And, he talks about these extensible-Constitutional rights in way that confuses himself on the issues. For example, "The laws relating to the registration of lobbyists have been challenged on First Amendment grounds" is his example trying to argue that lobbyists have had their right to speech infringed. fiddletown would recognize at once the absurdity of an appeal by a person that some act of murder was protected by first Amendment grounds. It isn't a right to speech that would be protected no matter what the appeal said. Likewise, prosecuting for the crime of lobbying without registering or filing required reports isn't infringing the criminal's first Amendment rights either.
Most of the many other points made by fiddletown seem similarly unrelated to the real Constitutional issue of government prosecution of people for the content of their speech.
But, I'm still waiting for instruction with an example writing by a founder who has said that the First Amendment speech protection applies to artificial entities and not just natural persons.
Legaleagle45, on the other hand, cites the change in the Constitution presented by the 14th Amendment. I think this is wrong too since that Amendment begins
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Again, I await instruction, but it seems to me that artificial entities are not protected in this Amendment since they aren't born or naturalized, so can't be citizens, and aren't persons protected by this Amendment.
That is not to say that the Courts didn't extended the Constitution once again for the 14th Amendment to artificial entities and then infringed the extension in some way as applied to artificial entities.
As I recall, there is a pretty good discussion in Congress of the legislative intent behind the 14th Amendment (most of which was ignored by the Court in Cruikshank). If these congressmen intended the 14th to apply to artificial entities, I would love to be instructed by their writings.