Firearms post-WW2

[Jim Watson]

In my first Dixie Gun Works catalog, Turner Kirkland showed the "cube" of Trapdoors he had stacked up. He said he was going to leave them there a while and see what they got to be worth.

Europeans pieced out their bolt actions with a lot of submachine guns.

 

[230RN]

I hope they were on the ground floor. There's at least 60 tons of them right there, although it's pretty spread out.

 

[Shanghai McCoy]

I seem to recall that some surplus rifles made their way into the hands of the early armed forces of Israel in the late 40's..?

 

[CapnMac]

that no other nation adopted semi automatic battle rifles prior to WWII, especially after the "bad guys" came to power, baffles me.

The Germans focused on making MGs. And the Brits were focused on the Bren.

The Japanese and Italians also focused manufacturing capacity on MGs (which wanted some sort of 7mm ammo, which distracted the rifle round used, and it was far faster to build bolt guns in 7.5 or 7.7 than self-loaders).

The Soviets were stuck with a bureaucratic system that did not respond quickly to needs and desires--or the realities in the field. Ultimately, they put a much larger effort into SMGs

 

[doubleh]

I once read that the reason we won WW II was the Garand rifle. I am willing to say it made a big difference but a lot of credit had to be given to other weapons, the B 17 bomber for example. Not least is the mettle of the solders that manned our weapons.

 

[OS/N]

Likely captured or surendered weapons. If you were on the wrong side after ww2 military weapons were not allowed. There are still many countries that can't buy military chambered firearms or ammo.

 

[GEM]

Someone probably knows the proportion of troops that got submachine guns in the German and Russian armies as the war progressed. I got the impression that they were more into it than the Allies.

 

[lysanderxiii]

Someone probably knows the proportion of troops that got submachine guns in the German and Russian armies as the war progressed. I got the impression that they were more into it than the Allies.

German Production (in thousands)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1940 . . . . . . . . .1941 . . . . . . . .1942 . . . . . . . . . 1943 . . . . . . . . . 1944 . . . . . . . . . 1945 . . . . . Total
Rifles . . . . . . . . . . . . 1352. . . . . . . . . 1359 . . . . . . . 1370 . . . . . . . . . 2275 . . . . . . . . . 2856 . . . . . . . . . 665 . . . . . .9877
Machine Pistols . . . . 119. . . . . . . . . . 325 . . . . . . . . 232 . . . . . . . . . . 234 . . . . . . . . . . 229 . . . . . . . . . . .78. . . . . . . 1217
Machine Guns . . . . . . 59. . . . . . . . . . .96 . . . . . . . . . 117 . . . . . . . . . . .263 . . . . . . . . . . 509 . . . . . . . . . . 111 . . . . . . .1156
Artillery . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . . . . 22 . . . . . . . . . 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 . . . . . . . . . . . 148 . . . . . . . . . . .27 . . . . . . . 318
Tanks and SPGs . . . . 2.2 . . . . . . . . . 3.8 . . . . . . . . . 6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7 . . . . . . . . . . 18.3 . . . . . . . . . .4.4. . . . . . . 45.6

Soviet Production (in thousands)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1940 . . . . . . . . .1941 . . . . . . . .1942 . . . . . . . . . 1943 . . . . . . . . . 1944 . . . . . . . . . 1945. . . . . .Total
Rifles . . . . . . . . . . . . 1462. . . . . . . . . 2421 . . . . . . . 4049 . . . . . . . . .3438 . . . . . . . . . 2451 . . . . . . . . . .703 . . . . . .14524
Machine Pistols . . . . . 92 . . . . . . . . . . 95 . . . . . . . . .570 . . . . . . . . . . 643 . . . . . . . . . . 555 . . . . . . . . . .272 . . . . . . 2227
Machine Guns . . . . . . 96. . . . . . . . . . .149 . . . . . . . . 356 . . . . . . . . . . 458 . . . . . . . . . . 439 . . . . . . . . . . 109 . . . . . . 1608
Artillery . . . . . . . . . . 15. . . . . . . . . . . .41 . . . . . . . . .128. . . . . . . . . . . 130 . . . . . . . . . . 122 . . . . . . . . . . . 77. . . . . . . .514
Tanks and SPGs . . . . 2.8 . . . . . . . . . .6.6 . . . . . . . . .24.7 . . . . . . . . . .24.0. . . . . . . . . . 29.0 . . . . . . . . . 22.6. . . . . . .109.7

(NOTE: Soviet 1945 production only goes until German capitulation)

(Data from "Industrial Mobilisation for World War II: A German Comparison," by Mark Harrison)

Despite starting the war, Germany did not get serious about production until mid 1942.

 

[lysanderxiii]

The Germans focused on making MGs. And the Brits were focused on the Bren.

The Japanese and Italians also focused manufacturing capacity on MGs (which wanted some sort of 7mm ammo, which distracted the rifle round used, and it was far faster to build bolt guns in 7.5 or 7.7 than self-loaders).

The Soviets were stuck with a bureaucratic system that did not respond quickly to needs and desires--or the realities in the field. Ultimately, they put a much larger effort into SMGs

The numbers indicate the Soviets responded very quickly to the demands of an attritional war.

Soviet MG production as a percentage of rifle production remained similar to German production, starting at 6%-7% in 1941 and 18% in 1944. Soviet SMG did increase as the war when on, but you also have to remember that from 1943 to 1945 they weren't loosing as many rifles as they were in 1941-42, and greatly expanding the army as well, so the increase in SMGs was probably going to rear area support personnel as much as front line troops.

 

[Slamfire]

I once read that the reason we won WW II was the Garand rifle. I am willing to say it made a big difference but a lot of credit had to be given to other weapons, the B 17 bomber for example. Not least is the mettle of the solders that manned our weapons.

I am sure fanboys of paper clips will claim the nickel finished paper clip is the reason we won WW2.

this author makes an excellent case why sea and air power were the reasons "we won the war".

How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II

WW2 was an unprecedented industrial war, and starving the enemy of resources, destroying their equipment in the factory, and on the way to the front, is how we won the war. Winning battles was of course important, but battle losses were replaceable for the Axis until we took over the air over Japan and Germany, destroyed everything that moved, especially replacements on their way to the front. Our submariners absolutely destroyed Japan's ability to bring raw resources from conquered countries to Japan to be made into weapons. And submariners sunk finished Japanese products (and people) on their way to the front. So incidentally, did the USAF. Destroying Germany's transportation network restricted the flow of raw materials to German factories, and finished materials back to the front. Blowing up German and Japanese factories required massive work around efforts. Some more successful than others.

Even though we had destroyed the Japanese Imperial Navy, pushed the Japanese back to their island nation, they were still capable of causing a million American causalities, had we invaded Japan. We were lucky we convinced them to quit with two big badda booms.

In a modern industry war, there is no such thing as a "strategic" battle, instead it is the total grinding down of men, material, and means of production, that ends the war. Industrial wars are meat grinders.

 

[Double_J]

The German Navy dominated the North Atlantic for quite some time using the same method we did as referenced above. They sank tonnage of shipping and material, and prevented the British from resupply, with the plan of starvation of food and war products. The main reason the British were able to hang on is the convoy system was improved and the production of Liberty ships. The Liberty ships were being built faster than the Germans could sink them, and so more material and troops were making it to the front lines. War by attrition is a brutal thing and there truly are no winners, only survivors.

 

[lightman]

Pretty sure I’ve seen this picture before, and I think those are k98’s. Lotta cupped buttplates, which Japanese rifles dont typically have. Also even tho the pic is grainy if you zoom in enough I think you can see where the rear sling mount goes on some of them, and a takedown disc or two.

The version i saw was clearer, and I want to say there was a German MG or two in the background.

Good Eye, Y'all!

 

[Savage30L]

From an ad in Guns Magazine, September, 1962:

 

[Savage30L]

Ooh! Look at this one, from the classifieds section of the same magazine......:

Aahh, the "good old days".....

 

[lysanderxiii]

WW2 was an unprecedented industrial war, and starving the enemy of resources, destroying their equipment in the factory, and on the way to the front, is how we won the war. Winning battles was of course important, but battle losses were replaceable for the Axis until we took over the air over Japan and Germany, destroyed everything that moved, especially replacements on their way to the front. Our submariners absolutely destroyed Japan's ability to bring raw resources from conquered countries to Japan to be made into weapons. And submariners sunk finished Japanese products (and people) on their way to the front. So incidentally, did the USAF. Destroying Germany's transportation network restricted the flow of raw materials to German factories, and finished materials back to the front. Blowing up German and Japanese factories required massive work around efforts. Some more successful than others.

Even though we had destroyed the Japanese Imperial Navy, pushed the Japanese back to their island nation, they were still capable of causing a million American causalities, had we invaded Japan. We were lucky we convinced them to quit with two big badda booms.

In a modern industry war, there is no such thing as a "strategic" battle, instead it is the total grinding down of men, material, and means of production, that ends the war. Industrial wars are meat grinders.

US and British strategic bombing was pretty ineffectual (by our own assessments at the time) until about the beginning of 1944. If you look at the production numbers, German production increased in 1944, and manages to match Soviet production (who were not subjected to massive bombing), so strategic bombing really had little effect on German industrial output.

The major accomplishment of strategic bombing was the reallocation of fighters to Germany from tactical air support in the east (and later west as well) to defend the homeland, and the destruction of these air assets while they were attempting to intercept the bombers. In fact, the only reason the USAAF continued daylight bombing over Germany was they calculated that they could destroy German fighters at a rate faster than they could replace them.

Strategic bombing of Japan's industry was also minimally effective, which is why Lemay switched from bombing of industrial targets to firebombing cities.

 

[lysanderxiii]

From an ad in Guns Magazine, September, 1962:

Adjusting for inflation, that Kar 98k price equates to around $300, still a bargain.

 

[tactikel]

Bolt actions were on the verge of obsolescence prior to WW II, cost of conversion and concerns of excess ammo usage lead to the decision to sacrifice soldiers to save money (funds which may or may not have been available).