W.E.G.
Member
suspected possession of loaded gun not grounds for search
Fourth Circuit rules search of West Virginia man not a legal search simply because police received report that man was in possession of a loaded gun.
Conviction for possession of firearm by felon reversed and vacated.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/144902.P.pdf
Per Judge Pamela Harris
"...we recognize that expanded rights to openly carry or
conceal guns in public may give rise to genuine safety concerns
on the part of police officers, as well as other citizens, who
more often will find themselves confronting individuals who may
be armed. But where a sovereign state has made the judgment
that its citizens may safely arm themselves in public, we cannot
presume that public gun possession gives rise to a reasonable
suspicion of dangerousness, no matter what the neighborhood.
And because the rest of the circumstances surrounding this
otherwise unremarkable traffic stop do not add appreciably to
the reasonable suspicion calculus, we must conclude that Terry
did not authorize the police to conduct a frisk of Robinson.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court
denying Robinson’s motion to suppress and vacate Robinson’s
conviction and sentence."
Fourth Circuit rules search of West Virginia man not a legal search simply because police received report that man was in possession of a loaded gun.
Conviction for possession of firearm by felon reversed and vacated.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/144902.P.pdf
Per Judge Pamela Harris
"...we recognize that expanded rights to openly carry or
conceal guns in public may give rise to genuine safety concerns
on the part of police officers, as well as other citizens, who
more often will find themselves confronting individuals who may
be armed. But where a sovereign state has made the judgment
that its citizens may safely arm themselves in public, we cannot
presume that public gun possession gives rise to a reasonable
suspicion of dangerousness, no matter what the neighborhood.
And because the rest of the circumstances surrounding this
otherwise unremarkable traffic stop do not add appreciably to
the reasonable suspicion calculus, we must conclude that Terry
did not authorize the police to conduct a frisk of Robinson.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court
denying Robinson’s motion to suppress and vacate Robinson’s
conviction and sentence."