Zoogster,
Please, no offense intended and none taken:
I, too, read technical documents as well as write them. Some contracts and some specifications, so I am acutely aware that "words mean things", too. Legalese is a different breed of cat, though, and does not necessarily directly translate into Layman-ese. (For lack of a better word.)
I would like some of the lawyers among us (like El Tejon, for one) to weigh in on some of these points and straighten me out if I am not on the right track, though.
I still think Scalia intentionally discussed the militia, the arms thereof and the intent of the Framers to have the militia equipped equal to the needs of military service upon activation. It appears he may have kicked the door open to the posessing of arms typical of the military by "the people" (the militia) by stating: (ppg 53)
We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses
our adoption of the original understanding of the Second
Amendment.
I think this is very relevant because he goes to such great lengths to refute the ascertions of the Dissent and flat out calls Stevens wrong on multiple occaisons. Especially where posession of military type weapons is concerned.
JUSTICE STEVENS’ statement that Presser “suggested that. . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside
the context of a militia,” post, at 40, is simply wrong.
Stevens was trying to establish the State Militia argument as valid and was rebuked by Scalia. (above)
We described the right
protected by the Second Amendment as “ ‘bearing arms for
a lawful purpose’ ”22 and said that “the people [must] look for their protection against any violation by their fellowcitizens
of the rights it recognizes” to the States’ police
power. 92 U. S., at 553.
I believe this is Scalia making the case that having weapons (arms) for militia duty is a "lawfull purpose". By taking Stevens to task and defining the militia, defining "arms" and alluding to a definition of "lawful purpose", I think he has certainly given us a strong argument in support of military arms posessed by the militia.
22 JUSTICE STEVENS’ accusation that this is “not accurate,” post, at 39, is wrong. It is true it was the indictment that described the right as
“bearing arms for a lawful purpose.” But, in explicit reference to the
right described in the indictment, the Court stated that “The second
amendment declares that it [i.e., the right of bearing arms for a lawful
purpose] shall not be infringed.” 92 U. S., at 553.
Another slap at Stevens and another statement that the 2nd means what it says. JMHO.
...their erroneous reliance upon
an uncontested and virtually unreasoned case cannot nullify the
reliance of millions of Americans (as our historical analysis has shown)
upon the true meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.
Again Scalia is telling Stevens he is all wet. Or so it appears. Also, it appears to me, Scalia is saying that
Miller is irrelevant to
Heller.
We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses
our adoption of the original understanding of the Second
Amendment.
I keep coming back to this statement by Scalia because he took such meticulous effort to define the militia, make the historical link of the militia being armed with like weapons as the military. His affirmation of the sawed off shotgun in Miller as being "unusual" is accurate as it would not typically be a weapon issued by the military.
I believe Scalia went a long way toward making the connection for us that the arms of the typical soldier are arms that are reasonably expected to be posessed by the militia and are therefore protected by the 2A. I think the quote below is most illustrative of Scalia's militia connection.
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful
in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be
banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely
detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said,
the conception of the militia at the time of the Second
Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens
capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of
lawful weapons that they posessed at home to militia
duty.
This again references the "correct" historical reading of the 2A and the direct connection of the arms of the military being necessary as the arms of the militia, too.
But the fact that modern developments have limited
the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the
protected right cannot change our interpretation of the
right.
I cannot see any other way Scalia could have said that the militia is expected to be equipped with modern battle rifles without using the taboo word "machinegun" but allows for the exclusion of grenades, RPG's, bazookas, and WMD's, etc. I think Scalia left it so that a logical argument can be made that because the M-16 has been denied the militia by the federal government, it has not been available to be "commonly posessed and used". Just a thought.
All in all, a very good Decision and a very good basis for future lawsuits. Evidently NRA and other people much smarter than me seem to think so, too.
Of course, all of my amature analysis is worth exactly what you paid for it. After all, I may be completely off my rocker and absolutely clueless, with nothing more than wishful thinking, too.
Here's to wishing us all lots of luck in upcoming suits!
Poper
PS: Sorry this got so long!
