Why Fewer Choices In Small Arms For Military Today?

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watch "Gallipoli" with Mel Gibson
Seen it, good movie, interesting ending :uhoh: . However, with the rest of your explination, I stand humbled. I just thought it would be nice to point out that the head of the ordnance dept. didn't like them, so we didn't adopt them. But, for the Henry problem--no battle may have been determined by superior firepower, but having Henry's oppose the Confederate troops demoralized said troops (they called it the gun that you could "load on sunday, and fire all week", IIRC), and may have had a large impact if more were issued. The potential for superior firepower was present, just not adopted in large numbers (Coffee Mill machine gun, Gatlings, Ironclads, Henrys, etc). Though, with your refrence to "the Gettysburg Campaign"; it is true that the arms don't make the man (or make him fight better)--good point to bring up.

As for a problem with the Gallipoli campaign, there was also a lot of miscommunication between artillery and infantry--which may have also contributed to the lunacy of the bayonet charge, given the circumstances (if you've seen the movie, you know to what I am referring).
 
Two points should be made:

First of all, the repeating rifles of the Civil War era weren't up to the expectations we have today. The .44 Henry was a mere pistol cartridge, and the Spencer not much better. The Henry in particular was fragile, and repair in the field was difficult.

Second, even fifty years later, with greatly improved repeaters, there was no tactical development that allowed armies to take advantage of the repeater -- the first inkling would come in the German Hutier tactics of 1918, and even then not until reliable field radios were available could full advantage be taken of improved rifles.

There were other inventions that COULD have been exploited, but were not -- for example, balloons were used but not routinely. A single observer in a balloon at Gettysburg could have more than made up for the absense of Stuart's cavalry.

The telegraph was used strategically, but not tactically. There is no technical reason that divisions could not unroll a telegraph line behind them as they advanced. Improved communications in battle would have made a great difference. (Of course, this assumes proper procedures were in place -- part of the British failure at Suvla Bay in the Gallipoli Campaign was in poor communications procedures.)
 
The reason our forces are STUCK with the limited number of guns goes all the way back to Robert McNamara and John Kennedy. In those days, McNamara and Kennedy actually kept some whiz kids around as advisors. The whiz kids were supposed to be applying "business application principles" to our military to make it more standardized and efficient. The whiz kids were actually from Ivy League colleges from the east coast like Yale and Harvard. These whiz kids were the ones who came up with "the one rifle idea for ALL services" and "the one fighter plane for ALL services." They made all sorts of stupid and dumb proposals that would actually cost our soldiers and sailors some of their lives. The whiz kids wanted to go to only ONE bullet for EVERY situation. If they would have had their choice, they would have made it so our military forces had ONLY the M-16 rifle and no other guns like the M-60 machineguns, the .45 pistol and so on for duty. You would have only had the M-16 to use no matter where you were or what you did. There would have been no pistols for MPs to use. Officers would not have had their pistols. Bail out of a burning jet behind enemy lines in N. Viet Nam and you would have your M-16, not a pistol with you. So, ever since the days of the McNamara/Kennedys/whiz kids, the idea of one gun will do everything just won't die or go away. This is the kind of thing that needs to be tossed into a grave and then beat to death with a shovel to bring it to an end. The last two Army units I was in, many of us had ideas about bringing "personal weapons" with us into combat. There was no way I was going to go into combat with another M-16 when I could bring my own M-1A scoped rifle with me. I suspect that many of our soldiers and Marines either did the same or are scrounging foreign weapons from captured stockpiles to use. Why is it that our military forces are ALWAYS having to scrounge things that they need as BASIC ITEMS for survival? I tell you, we need a law that will protect our troops.:banghead:
 
I hope this is not off the path, but one reason why many people hold the submachine gun in high regard relates to its role in World War 2. The Finns wreaked havoc on the Soviets with their Suomi SMGs when Stalin invaded their country in 1940. The Soviets remembered this bitter experience and went on to equip large numbers of their troops with SMGs following the German onslaught in 1941. And it was the SMG that played a role in the Soviet victories of Stalingrad and Leningrad, the stuff from which legends are born. Also, let us not forget that the Americans found the Thompson useful in jungle warfare and urban combat in Germany.

These examples from "the Good War" still linger in the minds of people today. While subsequent experience may demonstrate that better weapons and tactics exist today, the perceived effectiveness of the SMG stems from that conflict.


Timthinker
 
Must be Threads from the Dead week. Think this is the third or fourth I've read in the last 24 hours that had at least two years since its last post.

If they would have had their choice, they would have made it so our military forces had ONLY the M-16 rifle and no other guns like the M-60 machineguns, the .45 pistol and so on for duty. You would have only had the M-16 to use no matter where you were or what you did.

Have any documentation to prove this claim? The M16 was intended to fill the role of a number of weapons systems (as was the M14) -- no more seperate rifle, carbine, and SMGs. I do not know of anyone in the decision making loop back then who claimed or thought the M16 was a replacement for a sidearm or a medium machinegun.
 
As for a problem with the Gallipoli campaign, there was also a lot of miscommunication between artillery and infantry--which may have also contributed to the lunacy of the bayonet charge, given the circumstances (if you've seen the movie, you know to what I am referring).
The lunacy of the bayonet charge (with unloaded rifles) was written into Field Service Regulations before the Gallipoli campaign ever started.

Offensive tactics that capitalized on the capabilities of breechloading rifles were developed late in WWI, and were not fully effective until field radios became available.
 
My time with a combt rifle was Oct 68 to Oct 69. I found the M16 to be very effective with the M193 round.I never had anyone get up after being shot once. I understand M16 bashing as for a period of time in Nam,the powder for the 5.56 was wrong as was the lubracation. Without such a good weapon and round, I would not be writing this as would be for most of my company on that of March 5th and 6th, 1969. Byron
 
I never had anyone get up after being shot once.
About the same time you were there, I saw a man shot repeatedly before falling. I made the mistake of stepping over his body as we advanced, and he tried to shoot me in the back. Fortunately, I was in front of the skirmish line, and men following me shot him again.
 
I can only speak from my expereinces.One man from Kentucky was shot in the upper left torso from an AK. He jumped up and shot and killed the NVA.
Welcome Home Vern. Byron D co,3/8th Inf,4th Inf Div
 
Well in the army they say is all about logistics besides the fact that they say that they change cartridges for the fact that with the bigger cartridge, you shoot the enemy and is killed right away, his friend will get mad and attack more no matter what. But then with the 5.56 cartridge instead of a kill, he probably just be wounded and then his friend will stop to help him. So you stop 2 of the attackers instead of one. Logistics? maybe
I don't know this is some teaching they do in the army during sgt's time training. who knows
 
maybe
I don't know this is some teaching they do in the army during sgt's time training. who knows
No. You cannot find any design or requirements document that says the weapon should wound and not kill.

Remember, functional proponancy for rifles is with the Infantry. We don't see having the enemy survive after we shoot him as an advantage.
 
Vern Humphrey said:
I saw a man shot repeatedly before falling. I made the mistake of stepping over his body as we advanced, and he tried to shoot me in the back. Fortunately, I was in front of the skirmish line, and men following me shot him again.
This right here dispels that long time myth that the 5.56 round was "designed to wound so two soldiers would be taken off the battlefield". Yea, two guys could have been taken off the battlefield alright, one communist and one GI.

To paraphrase Gen. Patton: "The object of war is not to die for your country. It's to make the other sonofabitch die for his country".

Glad you made it back Vern and Byron.
 
An old thread, but I am going to toss in another factor: Convergence. Prior to WWII there were a lot of different weapon system concepts still being worked on. Blow backs, full power rifles, and out of WWII the assault rifle. All of these designs competed with each other for different battle spaces.. And survival of the fittest ensued. The full power rifle was too heavy, and the troops did not use the extended range, the submachine gun was too limited, but the .223 or 7.63*39 sort of works in most applications. So, logistically, who needs all that other stuff?

Another thing might be the peaking of firearm development. Firearm development peaked in WWII. Only the case less rifle was a significant advancement, and that went no where. Since the 1950’s, the materials have stayed the same, the propellants have stayed the same, and the weapon principals are unchanged from the 1890’s. Just a little tweaking here and there. Basically it is same old, same old.

Now, when we get plasma rifles, then you will see a change. Maybe Phasers too.

Beam me up Scotty.
 
Offensive tactics that capitalized on the capabilities of breechloading rifles were developed late in WWI, and were not fully effective until field radios became available.

That entire campaign was characterized by miscommunication and horrific leadership. The ANZAC troops were led by British general officers who had learned about fighitng from static trench positions on the Western Front. Breakthroughs were NOT impossible, in spite of the modern notion that no men could best a Maxim. The key was good communication and coordination, but sadly both were generally non-existent. Indeed at one point early in the campaign the ANZAC units plus some troops from another commonwealth nation I forget were poised to roll up the whole Turish line. But as soon as the general officers got wind of how much territory the advancing units were taking they got NERVOUS and ordered the entire operation to halt and dig in! That gave enough breathing room for a young Turkish officer, Mustafa Kemal, to rally the retreating units and form a defensive line on high ground.

Idiocy like this was repeated all over WWI, though it was more often with British and French commands than with German. By the end of the war both sides had started to figure out how to make armies function. The Canadians in particular finally learned how to make a rolling barrage work, mostly by exhaustive training and fully informing the men themselves about what objectives they would be taking. They even gave common private soldiers MAPS of their objectives ahead of time--something that gave the British commanders aneurysms.

As far as what the problems are facing troops in Iraq and Afghanistan today, it's far too early to say for sure. Though I suspect the reliance on a limited array of weapons platforms for the troops and an over-use of expensive missiles and air strikes will be seen as shortcomings. I personally feel that the adherence to 19th century notions of "civilized" bullets is particularly stupid. We could be giving ground troops a whole array of extremly lethal projectiles for their small arms.
 
A major problem the British faced was starting the war with a small, professional army. They needed a mass army, and had difficulty building it -- and they also felt that such an army couldn't be trained to do much more than mass attacks.

That was exacerbated by the reluctance of top British generals to go into the front lines and see for themselves. French only went to say good bye, and burst into tears when he actually saw the conditions there. Haig wouldn't even visit the wounded -- afraid it might make him "soft,"
 
One of the great tragedies of that war was the decision to use the professional army of 1914 up in the trenches instead of moving the best of them back to blighty to train the volunteers. The Brits went from having a small number of extremely good soldiers (the ones who could cycle an SMLE bolt so fast it seemed like an automatic) to a huge army of virtually untrained soldiers.
 
That's II Corps. I was an adviser in III Corps (18th ARVN Division) my first tour, and in I Corps my second tour. My brigade (1st Bde, 5th ID) replaced a reserve Marine regiment in 3rd MarDiv, so I get two combat patches out of that.
 
Wasn't that SOP until then, though, in most wars?

It depends on the war. The Brits had fought dozens of imperial wars with their professional troops. I don't think the high command had any respect at all for the skills of the soldiers. To them a soldier was simple fodder, of no value at all except to fill out the ranks. They didn't need to know how to shoot because they could just run up and get the bayonet in. The elite of British society were closer in spirit and friendship with their opposite numbers among the Germans than they were with their own men. Indeed among the Royals they were closer in blood as well. IIRC one of that lot was writing letters to his cousin the Kaiser all through the war. This mistrust between the classes got much worse after the Russian revolution.
 
huge army of virtually untrained soldiers

Wasn't that SOP until then, though, in most wars?
No, not at all. The nations of Europe (except for Britain) had huge armies of trained soldiers. They practiced universal military training, and all young men were drafted. When they finished their time with the colors, they were discharged into the reserves. A large proportion of them served in organized reserve units. At the out break of WWI, the Germans had a large active Army, and could field a battle-worthy reserve corps for every active corps -- plus almost unlimited "fillers" of already-trained men.

The British had a small "Territorial" reserve force, but nothing to compare to what the French, Germans, and so on had.
 
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