Appeasement

[Iain]

This came up in another thread, and so to separate those issues (those of the atomic bomb and appeasement) I thought I would start this thread. It appears that it is a huge issue, some trace the ''feminisation'' of British culture to this point while others argue that it was fundamentally wrong. I have a lot more respect for the second position than the first.

This is the conclusion of a 6,000 word essay I am presently writing about the policies of the 1930's towards Hitler. Read and respond in the same manner as it is written. That kind of saves on the whole personal abuse thing.

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Hindsight has judged Chamberlain guilty of the appeasement of the worst regime in history. Chamberlain’s actions after Munich, and during that meeting, have confirmed his guilt in the eyes of many. From that meeting in 1938 he made mistakes in compounded them with a mixture of optimism - of peace and defeatism.

Chamberlain is most often judged on the way his actions look to us now. Certainly Eden never forgot the way appeasement came to look after 1930, possibly a major cause of his hasty actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Chamberlain was considering peace and not placing the country on a full war footing right up until the power of his administration was broken by Kingsley Wood and others in May 1940. In the light of more complete knowledge of the scope and scale of the ‘achievements’ of the Nazi regime, and the failure of Chamberlain to properly respond to the outbreak of war, Chamberlain’s policy prior to Munich began to look like that of a coward, a fool or a weakling.

Had Chamberlains actions been successful, had a war between Britain and Germany been avoided, then Chamberlain would be remembered with Gandhi as one of the most successful advocates of peace in human history. This ignores the realities of Hitlerian Germany, realities that made Chamberlain unlikely to succeed. He was even open to an application for peace from Germany after the outbreak of war. By now he was decided; “He [Hitler] must either die, or go to St. Helena†(Gilbert and Gott. 1963. pp. 346). There is a marked lack of reality to modern eyes in this hope, and increasingly Chamberlain was becoming distant from political and public opinion by this point, and it led to his downfall. By 1939 Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons that:

We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi government. As long as that government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe. (UE. pp.247)

Prior to 1939 however, Chamberlain was very much in line with public opinion. There was much, and still is much, criticism of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the later Locarno Pact. This treaty led to a demilitarised Rhineland, and Germany split by a Polish area of land that gave Poland access to the sea and control of Danzig. There were strict limitations on German military power and the German economy was arguably stifled by the reparation repayments demanded. By the 1930’s many members of the British public and press felt that the Treaty of Versailles had gone too far and blamed the French for this. Too often critics of appeasement have blamed Chamberlain for conceding to German in 1936 and after, and simultaneously blamed Britain and France for the harsh terms of Versailles. Some might agree that Chamberlain’s actions over the Rhineland and German rearmament were carried out in the light of the widely held belief that Versailles was too draconian.

Chamberlain is damned in the popular memory for his failure to stand up to the tyrant that Hitler was. The Nazi anti-Semitic policies and their repercussions, such as Kristallnacht, were known. Anti-Semitism was not exclusive to Germany at this time. In fact some attribute the fall of Hore-Belisha as Minister of War in 1940 to the fact that he was Jewish. Wedgwood had to tell the Commons on January the 16th “The Prime Minister denies that the Secretary of State was dismissed because he was a Jew. He cannot deny that the prejudice against him was because he was a Jew.†(ibid. pp. 348). Hitler was not the first, nor the last, tyrant to be given free reign by many in the international community. Britain was not the first, nor the last country to fail to fulfil the spirit of its obligations and treaties to another country like it did to Czechoslovakia. Churchill was nearly a lone voice when he said of T. E. Lawrence: “In Colonel Lawrence we have lost one of the greatest beings of our time…I hoped to see him quit his retirement and take a commanding part in the dangers now facing this country.†Churchill was out of government and out on a limb during most of the 1930s. His actions over India and his parliamentary habits had not endeared him to many. He nearly lost the support of his constituency in 1938 when he “assailed the ‘Prince of Peace’, as Chamberlain temporarily appeared to most local Conservativesâ€. (Jenkins. 2001. pp.530) Gilbert and Gott wrote in the first page of the ‘Acknowledgements’ of their classic “The Appeasers†written in 1963:

We have been inspired by the example of Englishmen who refused to be bullied by Nazi bombast…who determined to stand up to that bully…and who urged England not to compromise with evil…We owe a special debt to these men, who by their example, convinced us of the need to tell this sad story of British weakness, not haltingly, but forthrightly. For it is also a story of British strength in the end; of the defeat of appeasement; of the triumph of honour.

However Keith Robbins writes “Appeasement was not a ‘success’ long enough to allow contemporaries to praise its merits in any depth…there were some [contemporary] historians who believed that government policy was broadly on the right lines†(Robbins. 1988. pp1) Herein is the difficulty that faces those who wish to establish the merits of appeasement. The judgement made by many is made in the light of events that occurred after 1939-40, those events being the defeat of the allies that led to Dunkirk, the Holocaust, the triumphant allied victory that led to the end of the Nazi regime and others. It is easy to see pure evil in action when watching the Nuremberg speeches on television now. At the time however it was not so obvious.

The actions of the British Government over the Rhineland, the Anschluss and even Czechoslovakia were thought by some to actually increase the likelihood of peace in Europe. Now those events are seen as evidence of Hitler’s belligerence, at the time they were seen as a shift in the balance of European power, and not necessarily an unwelcome one. Apart from germanophobes such as Vansittart, many saw Germany as Britain’s natural European ally and blamed France for its pitiful state. The aggressiveness of its government, and some of that government’s internal policies, were not welcome, but were seen as a sort of “youthful exuberance†that would calm down as the regime matured.

Failure to prepare is another charge often laid it Chamberlain’s door. Britain was not on a full war footing by 1940, but to attribute that entirely to Chamberlain is not entirely accurate. Kingsley Wood consisted asked for more money in his role as Secretary of State for Air, Simon told him that ‘such spending might lead to inflation, “a rise in prices, in wages, in interest rates†and involve “some real injury to our financial strength.â€â€™

Allowing Germany its claims over the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland and colonies without war was thought a way to redress wrongs, restore Germany, to avoid the break up of the British Empire, but most importantly: to avoid another European war. It is easy to see how this fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the Nazis, Hitler and their ambitions. Who understands that regime even now?

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Any proof reading posts are also welcome, I have cut and paste this straight from Word.

 

[Iain]

No-one?

 

[Old Fuff]

Socialists of that period, in both Britain and France tended to see the world through rose-colored glasses, and the Communists that were aware of the alliance between the USSR and Germany supported Hitler’s ambitions so long as they were not directed toward the “Mother State.â€

Consequently, then as now the solution to disputes were to be sought through diplomacy rather then armed force. In England armed force was largely a joke because the Socialist governments throughout the 20’s and 30’s cut military spending at all levels so they could support ever-larger welfare programs in an era of economic depression. Consequently Chamberlain perused appeasement because he didn’t have any other realistic options. Would he done otherwise if the necessary military assets had been available? I doubt it. He was after all, a Socialist.

 

[CZ52GUY]

Short version...

While I don't have the time to provide a detailed critique, I would differ with you based on your premise...that being, if Hitler could have been contained, than all would have been well, and Chamberlain would have been thought of in a far different light.

Hitler then, as I believe Saddam was up until March 19th 2003, was a threat. History proves it, in both instances.

Chamberlain deserves to be judged on the results of his actions, as do all of us, not what might have been.

We have no reason to believe that a containment policy would have prevented the holocaust.

The good people of Czechoslavakia and Austria did not choose that tyrant, Chamberlain had no standing to make that choice for them.

Comparisons with Ghandi who fought for liberations of oppressed people are hardly credible with one who sought to doom millions to live under the thumb of Hitler indefinitely, for his own convenience.

Bottom line, evil can never be legitimately appeased because the bargaining position is clearly weighted toward the aggressor. Evil must always be confronted because the alternative is to depend on the good graces of one that is not good.

Your essay is thoughtful and well written with arguments that are morally and logically flawed...because it appears you seek to apologize for Chamberlain's negligence in a similar manner as he tried to convince the world of the merits of leaving millions to the tender mercies of a tyrant whose character (albeit the extent thereof was not quantified) was already known.

Regards,

CZ52'

 

[Mike Irwin]

Chill, St Johns...

I'm still digesting.

 

[Iain]

Fuff - Chamberlain was not a socialist, he was a Conservative with a very large capital 'C'. Armament policy in the 20's and 30's was based on the '10 Year Rule', that being that there was to be no major war in the next ten years. Something of an assumption. It must also be borne in mind that military technology was moving at a very fast rate at this time, Italy had the most up to date air force in 1937 it was out of date by 1939.

CZ - you seem to have made a large assumption. That being that I am out to defend Chamberlain. Defend him perhaps from his most unfair of critics by being a milder and I think more accurate critic.

I have clearly identified flaws within Chamberlains logic and the rest of the dissertation will/has outlined these further. I did not suggest that containment was a viable policy or that it would have prevented the Holocaust. The atmosphere of Gandhi was prevalent at the time, there is no doubt that Gandhis movement was in the minds of many.

Britain was not an international policeman at the time, its power was on the wane. Many Americans do not want to get involved where they are not threatened today, many Britons did not then or now.

I personally think that a lot of assumptions are made about the policies of Chamberlain, yes Chamberlain knew about the expansionist passages in Mein Kampf and the Hitlerian concept of living space (liebsraum), the implications could hardly be known. In fact the say that Hitler was ''evil'' in the 1930's is to clearly use a value judgement based on the facts as they were after the war. Hitler was a popular leader with many Germans and Chamberlain was popular with Germans when he avoided war.

To rearm in the 1930's was widely perceived as unnecessary and possibly provoking. The British government fulfilled, to the point of the seizure of Prague and their failure to act then, the exact terms of their treaty with Czechoslovakia. Many were far more concerned with British peace and security than they were with events in the east of Europe.

An alliance with the Soviets was out of the question. Many were more opposed to the 'Reds' than they were to Hitler. Churchill was originally one of them. Rearmament of Germany had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly preceeded Chamberlains government. Of the allowed 100,000 troops the Germans had 40,000 NCO's in case of a sudden conscription drive. The German government conspired with arms manufacturers such as Junkers and Heinkel to keep evidence of banned weapons manufacture from the arms inspection committee.

Appeasement had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly most trace it back to 1933, prior to Chamberlain. The National Government of Baldwin certainly sought to appease German grievances over reparations (some estimated that under the original terms of Versaille Germany would have finished reparations in 1982) and colonies. Versaille had neutered a world power, many elsewhere sought to undo the damage done to Germany as a way to placate its youthful radical leaders.

I often make the same value judgements as Robbins says 'no historian writes in a vacuum', yet the whole point is to try to understand the complexities of a policy that was not in reality a single policy but a series of policies based on economic, military and world power balance factors.

Morally and logically flawed?

 

[Destructo6]

That's a lot of ifs.

I believe I would have been on the side of Anthony Eden, who resigned from Chamberlain's government over appeasement, and oppossed it. I would certainly roundly comdem giving away things that belonged to others, namely Austria and Czechoslavakia.

 

[Iain]

Eden was an early appeaser who changed his mind later on. Some argue that at the point that Eden switched sides was the easiest point to do so and that to maintain a 'appeasement' position was far harder. What I would have done? No idea - had I been able to see the realities of the Nazi regime then obviously I would have attacked them. To state that Hitler was an aggressive expansionist as late as the Anschluss was playing around with a whole lot of 'ifs'.

Austria - the Anschluss was not all that unpopular in Austria. Robbins writes ''Reports suggested that, on the whole, German troops had been well received...It was not possible to come to the aid of state that did not seem that anxious to survive.'' (pp.79)

Czechoslovakia - strange case, not a stable nation in fact a new creation. The original takeover of the Sudetenland was not vastly unpopular in the international community, after all the people that Hitler wanted control over were ethnically German, and many of them violently supported the Nazi party. Rioting was making the region unstable, Benes was under pressure both internal and external. Britain honoured its obligation to protect the Czechoslovakian state (up until prague was seized), it never promised to protect Czechoslovakian borders. Political games? Certainly - which government does not play them. The sentiment was ''We do not want to get involved in the fate of a country that does not concern us.'' A certain degree of isolationism was not unique to the US at this time. Another European land war was high on the list of 'to avoid'.

 

[CZ52GUY]

By point...

CZ - you seem to have made a large assumption. That being that I am out to defend Chamberlain. Defend him perhaps from his most unfair of critics by being a milder and I think more accurate critic.

I am not assuming, I am reading your essay and providing my thoughts on the assessment of Chamberlain you provide, as a reader thereof. There was not an intent to impugn your motives, rather to assess the content of the essay and provide a brief critique of the substance of the message I read.

Britain was not an international policeman at the time, its power was on the wane. Many Americans do not want to get involved where they are not threatened today, many Britons did not then or now.

It was Chamberlain who inserted himself as one with standing to negotiate with Hitler. I did not allocate a claim of British responsibility for the Czech's and Austrians...it was Chamberlain who assumed that role without the consent of those whom Hitler had taken hostage.

I personally think that a lot of assumptions are made about the policies of Chamberlain, yes Chamberlain knew about the expansionist passages in Mein Kampf and the Hitlerian concept of living space (liebsraum), the implications could hardly be known. In fact the say that Hitler was ''evil'' in the 1930's is to clearly use a value judgement based on the facts as they were after the war. Hitler was a popular leader with many Germans and Chamberlain was popular with Germans when he avoided war.

The "sin" of Austria and Czechoslovakia were sufficient to recognize that this individual was no friend of liberty. It is not Chamberlain's lack of an immediate "Bush-like" response that convicts Chamberlain...it's his assertion of "peace in our time" and arrogant sentencing of the Austrians and Czechs to life under Hitler that does. He became an advocate for sustaining Hitler's early crimes, which history shows emboldened him rather than appeasing him...which is consistent with attempts to appease aggressive behavior, it's a flawed strategy based on its effectivity (or lack thereof), the morality temporarily set aside.

To rearm in the 1930's was widely perceived as unnecessary and possibly provoking. The British government fulfilled, to the point of the seizure of Prague and their failure to act then, the exact terms of their treaty with Czechoslovakia. Many were far more concerned with British peace and security than they were with events in the east of Europe.

Again, allowing an aggressor to intimidate based on fear of being seen as "provoking their wrath" is intentionally following the path of the victim. One seeks to arm themselves or become proficient in martial combat not to provoke, but to prepare for unwanted conflict. That Britain allowed themselves to become unprepared is fairly allocated to those who were in power at the time. Their job description involved "risk management", for which history indicts them. Again, it is always fair to judge individuals (this poster included) based on their performance compared with the responsibilities they are allocated.

An alliance with the Soviets was out of the question. Many were more opposed to the 'Reds' than they were to Hitler. Churchill was originally one of them. Rearmament of Germany had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly preceeded Chamberlains government. Of the allowed 100,000 troops the Germans had 40,000 NCO's in case of a sudden conscription drive. The German government conspired with arms manufacturers such as Junkers and Heinkel to keep evidence of banned weapons manufacture from the arms inspection committee.

I believe that is why an alliance with the United States proved beneficial, and the eventual alliance with the Soviets a "necessary evil". This does not acquit Chamberlain of the sins for which history has convicted him.

Appeasement had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly most trace it back to 1933, prior to Chamberlain. The National Government of Baldwin certainly sought to appease German grievances over reparations (some estimated that under the original terms of Versaille Germany would have finished reparations in 1982) and colonies. Versaille had neutered a world power, many elsewhere sought to undo the damage done to Germany as a way to placate its youthful radical leaders.

The post of Prime Minister carried with it responsibilities that the historical context you provide does not free Mr. Chamberlain from. The post is one of head of state, which requires leadership.

I often make the same value judgements as Robbins says 'no historian writes in a vacuum', yet the whole point is to try to understand the complexities of a policy that was not in reality a single policy but a series of policies based on economic, military and world power balance factors.

The "contextual" elements you describe are useful in describing the factors which could have provided weight to arguments Chamberlain would have considered, the damning evidence is that a crime was committed by Hitler against two sovereign nations. Chamberlain's response was to insist to Hitler that he stop the carnage there. That is not justice, and therefore where no justice is served, the threat remains...which is true within our society to this day at other levels.

Morally and logically flawed?

Logically = Appeasement never works, so there is no logical defense of one who employs a strategy that consistently fails.

Morally = The crime of violating the sovereignty of Czech's/Slovaks and Austrians was committed by Hitler...Chamberlain helped "legitimize it"...there is no historical context that can be applied to abdicate the historical responsibility that Chamberlain correctly assumes. He didn't commit Hitler's crimes...but he certainly was an important enabler.

Regards,

CZ52'

 

[Iain]

CZ I don't disagree with some of that, although I feel it is unfair to damn a man based on what we know now.

With regards to Austria and Czechoslovakia - posted stuff about that while you were posting your last post I think.

 

[Iain]

Another section:

(this is rough still)
The mood in Britain at this time is often discussed; examples are given, like that of the debate of the Oxford Union on the 9th of February 1931. That famous debating society passed a motion, 275 votes to 133, stating that ‘This House declines to fight for King or country.’ The significance of the motion has long been debated itself, was it a clear motion, was the pacifism of the students part of the rebelliousness of youth, particularly youth raised amid the First World War. Historians have sought the exact definition of the pacifist tendencies in Britain at the time.

Some divide the public into two sections, those of pacifists and pacificists (Robbins, 1988, pp.25). The former described as persons following an ‘act of faith’, the latter being principled and pragmatic. It does seem that a pacifist outlook was part of Britain’s character at this time. No war movements had been started, such luminaries as Bertrand Russell and George Lansbury were very highly involved in these movements. The Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 had discussed the ‘outlawry of war’ and the 1930 Lambeth Conference concluded that war as a settlement of international dispute was against Christ’s teachings. Gilbert and Gott identify the year 1933 as the ‘beginning of appeasement’ and the examples cited above do not contradict this necessarily. There were appeasers who did not appeal to this notion of the avoidance of war at all costs, but also recognised that war was loathsome. Pacifists were not necessarily appeasers, rather than ‘craven or covert sympathisers with Fascism’ (ibid, pp. 26) they took the principle of the avoidance of war to be their guiding one and other policies or practicalities are almost irrelevant to this principle.

George Lansbury was one of these. As Labour leader from 1931 to 1935 he often voiced his opinion on foreign policy described as a policy that ‘advocated unconditional non-violence’ (Parker, 1993. pp.309) The National Government was in place throughout these years and despite the previous trend that some had thought would lead to a total domination of the polls following universal suffrage, the Labour Party was increasingly looking ineffectual as opposition to the government. Lansbury was savaged by the trade union leader Ernest Bevin, for ‘taking your conscience around from body to body’ (ibid. pp.310). Lansbury was a passionate advocate of the League of Nations, in the same year that he resigned as leader of the Labour Party the League Union (a private pro-League organisation) held what is essentially the largest private referendum ever held in Britain. Of those that responded 11 million supported remaining in the League of Nations, 10 million of those supported economic and non-military measures against an aggressor nation. Of that 10 million, 6 and three-quarter million were prepared to take military actions.

Another example of the public mood is the bye-election in Fulham in 1934 in which a Labour candidate took the seat from a Government candidate on a large swing. At the time many identified the cause as being due to the Labour candidate’s outspoken pacifism, now the cause is identified elsewhere.

The realistic prospect of establishing a public mood is slight though; events throughout the 1930’s were responsible for the changing of many a mind. Some, having seen the horrors of the First World War were strongly opposed to violence and yet the realities of the world political stage can make war seem inevitable and necessary.

 

[Gray Peterson]

To inject some firearms related logic into this:

The Minnesota CCRN (thank you guys, I'm seriously considering getting a non-resident permit from MN, but could you please work on getting Minnesota to recognize Utah or Florida so I can go there without going there to get a permit first?), figured out back in 2001 and 2002 that their attempts at appeasing some members of the law enforcement lobby were fruitless.

In that the lobbies had claimed they would support it if they made certain concessions, it was figured out quickly that they would never support it, no matter how many concessions were made, so CCRN pressed on, saying "We made deals, you broke them, no more deals". Eventually, a GOP House was elected, a GOP governor (Tim Pawlenty), and a pro-carry but still democratic majority senate. The Senate leaders played games, so the House amended the DNR bill with PTC reform on it. Senate debated 8 and a half hours, and it was finally voted on, 37-30, in favor.

Clearly the Churchill method of doing things in MN worked.

 

[CZ52GUY]

St Johns

Was Chamberlain Prime Minister? Yes

Is he accountable for what his actions or lack thereof resulted in? Yes

...it goes with the suit...similarly, we will judge heads of state of our government based on the net impact of their actions or lack thereof, not whether "it seemed like a good idea at the time"...

We need to raise the bar for those who take on the role of head of state. To so easily give them a pass is to fail to acknowledge the awesome responsibility they are given.

What we can try to do is learn from their mistakes and support policies consistent with what works, and what is right.

I think that too often we are tempted to identify with historical figures based on our own circumstances...and are too often tempted to set the bar far too low (both for them and our own standards of exellence that we set for ourselves).

You and I are not heads of state, Chamberlain was...in the end, he helped Hitler become what he became. He couldn't run and hide from that and we can't rightly attempt to re-write the end of the play to be more favorable to his circumstances.

Did Chamberlain intend to provide Hitler with legitimacy and embolden further aggression? I doubt it, but he made touch choices and his legacy must be judged based on the results, not the intent.

Regards,

CZ52'

 

[CZ52GUY]

Additional context...

I think your thorough communication of historical context is interesting but in the end you pile on all the "excuses" which can be made for pursuing a failed policy.

If your intent is to make a case for all the "causal factors" that went into shaping Chamberlain's decision, you've done a very good job of bringing them together.

In the end, to paraphrase a contemporary politician of Chamberlain's, the buck stops with Chamberlain...he was head of state...he must shoulder the historical responsibility for the actions he took.

No amount of historical context or environmental conditions can shield us from the results of our actions. A congressmen hit a motorcyclist recently and I'm sure charges will be filed. He will find an advocate who will seek to provide a defense for him...in the end, a life was ended...not out of pre-meditation, but out of negligence, carelessness, and as the result of a previous unlawful act (running a stop sign if the reports are correct).

The criminal involved has had a "distinguished career", but his legacy will unfortunately be that he killed someone because of carelessness or incompetence behind the wheel. He will never be able to run and hide from that, because the impact of his crime was severe, and permanent. There can be no remedy, no restitution, and no excuse.

60 years from now someone will seek to look at his full record...and show how many people ran stop signs and how motorcycles were difficult to see...and so on and so on and so on...but in the end a crime will still have been committed, the victim will still be dead, his loved ones will have had to carry on without him...and no amount of rationalization will change that.

The same is true for Chamberlain.

Regards,

CZ52'

 

[hops]

It is easy for us to condem the leaders of Europe, with 20-20 hindsight.

We all forget about the looming Communist threat. Had Germany gone communist in 1919 as did Russia, the world would be would different today. Remember, from 1927 or so until when Hitler became Reichskanzler in 1933, the Communist militias battled the NAZI militias in the open streets of Germany. The German gun control laws of 1928 tried to curtail the violence.

By the mid 1930's there was remorse among Britain and Frence for the injustice of Versailles. A strong Germany was needed then, just as a strong Germany was needed after 1950. What was wanted was a Germany whose interests were aligned with that of France and England. Well, big dogs seem to have a mind of their own. The U.S, seems to prove this a lot since the collapse of the Soviet Super Power.

Russia was the bigger threat, with its exportation of the communist ideals. That Stalin had 14 million Soviet troops on his borders in the summer of 1941 does ponder the question what his plans really were.

The Austrian Anschluss was a mutual Austrian - German wish, since 1918.

The German move and occupation of the CZ republic was interesting. There Germans were so nice to the CZ's that Britain had to send in a three man Hit team to assasinate Hydrich, because the CZ's were working well with the Germans.

Hitler's biggest mistake was not understanding England's, effective, policy regarding Europe, in effect since the 1500's. Make sure that no single European power wins on the Continent. Spain in the 1500/1600's, France and Holland in the 1600-1800's and Germany in the 1900's.

Had Hitler understood this, he might have gotten a peace after Poland. Especially after Soviet aggression against the Baltic states and Finland. He still insited as his peace terms that all lost German lands and Colonies be returned in the fall of 1939. That was just not going to happen.

With Versailles, the seeds were planted for a future war. In fact, one can say that America's lack of forcing France and England to adopt all of Wilson's 14 points in 1919, helped plant the seed. Germany aggreed to an armestice on Wilsons 14 points, where were very generous terms when compared to Versailles.

By 1945 the lesson had been learned. Unconditional surrender was worse then Versailles, yet America's involvement in rebuidling Europe was the best thing for Europe.

Chamberlain was playing against a stacked deck, dealt to him by Loyd George and Clemmenceau 20 years before.

 

[CZ52GUY]

hops

I would dispute that the Austrians and Czechs wanted what Hitler imposed upon them...and I think it can be reasonably debated as to whether there was majority consent to the within these nations for absorption into the 3rd Reich. I don't recall the referendum where they chose to become part of Germany...

With Versailles, the seeds were planted for a future war. In fact, one can say that America's lack of forcing France and England to adopt all of Wilson's 14 points in 1919, helped plant the seed. Germany aggreed to an armestice on Wilsons 14 points, where were very generous terms when compared to Versailles.

While one can say just about anything, to suggest the America of 1919 could force terms on France and England is ridiculous, and if you're attempting to blame the US for WWII, you are completely out in left field...way left, going, going, gone...

Was Chamberlain part of the problem or part of the solution?

I'd argue that Chamberlain was part of the problem. By the time Churchill showed up, the deck was stacked significantly higher against him than was against Chamberlain.

Chamberlain's appeasement failed, Churchill's resolve and defiance succeeded. History appropriately recognizes both men for their performance.

St John's essay provides excellent historical context to the circumstances that existed at the time. It doesn't absolve Chamberlain from the results of his actions (or lack thereof)...your arguments do not either.

Yes, it is easier to judge results after the fact...but that is the metric that is applied to world leaders...comes with the job.

Regards,

CZ52'

 

[Destructo6]

It doesn't matter if some of the residents of the Sudatenland, parts of Czechoslavakia or any other country wanted to join Germany. That was a matter that should have been decided between the two countries and voluntarily by all parties affected. It was not something that should have been decided by a third party, Chamberlain.

had I been able to see the realities of the Nazi regime then obviously I would have attacked them.

It's all in Mein Kampf. Lock, stock, and barrel (to keep it firearms related).

 

[Mike Irwin]

I find myself to be in a peculiarly bad position at the moment.

It seems that my ing ex wife has most, if not all, of my books on this period in English history, including my copies of Gilbert & Gott (which was not complimentary of Chamberlain's policy of appeasment), Fuchser's book (the title escapes me) and, worst of all, Charmley's book "Chamberlain and Lost Peace," which is probably still the poster child for "appeasement really worked, but no one is smart enough to relize it" crowd that has sprung up in the past 25 years.

David Dutton's recent book hasn't made it into my collection yet, either, but from all account's it is an intersting examination not of Chamberlain's failings, but the process by which Chamberlain is now blamed for leading Britain to war.

It looks like the ex also got copies of books that are UNFRIGGINGBELIEVABLY DIFFICULT to find in this country, including my British first edition of Violet Asquith's "Churchill as I Knew Him."

Pardon me while I hyperventilate for awhile and figure out just how I'm going to reassemble my reference library so I can positive respond to your thesis summary.

There's little doubt, though, that Charmley figures prominently in your basic premise.

 

[Mike Irwin]

Now that I have that little rant out of the way...


St. John,

First and foremost, I find there to be a serious conceptual flaw in your equating Chamberlain and Ghandi as "peacemakers."

That appellation, or at least attempted peacemaker, can be given to Chamberlain, despite his failures, but I do not believe that it can, or should, be given to Ghandi.

Ghandi was first and foremost a revolutionary. He may have been a pacifist, but he was not a peacemaker.

Fundamentally, Chamberlain pursued policies that attempted to preserve peace at all cost.

Ghandi, on the other hand, advocated policies of passive non-resistance. He knew, and in fact counted on, the fact that such a program would serve a two-fold purpose:

First, it would (and did) make British administration of India exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

Second, (and Ghandi counted on this) it would allow the Indian population to seize the moral highground on the world stage and would help sway world opinion against Britain.

Gen. Dyer incompetently played right into that tactic when he ordered his troops to open fire on unarmed and peaceful demonstrators at Amritsar.

Ghandi was a proponent of violence, as long as it was directed against his cause, not outward from his cause.

 

[HBK]

Chamberlain was a moron. He said he guaranteed "peace in our time." What a crock. History proved him wrong. Just my opinion, it could be wrong.

 

[Iain]

I tell you what - I'll delete the Gandhi reference, it was not an equation of Chamberlain to Gandhi more a indication of the spirit of the times as Robbins says:

"A British government might have been in a position, up to a point, to determine how Britain should behave, but it could not control the lobs dropped into its court by Hitler, Mussolini, Gandhi or Roosevelt, to mention but four names.''

I'm confused as to why you seem to think that I am excusing Chamberlain. My criticisms of Chamberlain are not harsh granted but I do say things like 'there is a marked lack of reality' and 'this is to misunderstand the nature of the Hitlerian regime.'

My research has been based on Gilbert and Gott's 'The Appeasers', Roy Jenkins' 'Churchill' (very good btw) RAC Parkers' 'Chamberlain', Keith Robbins' 'Appeasement', Uncovered Editions original papers 'Dealing with Adolf Hitler: War 1939'. Charmley does not enter in to it.

Chamberlain was not about peace at all costs, after all he declared war in the end over Poland, not over Britain. And the idea that the British were left undefended in 1939 is also unfair:

"The efficiency of the airforce and navy in 1940 refutes the denunciation of Chamberlain as irresponsibly reckless."

From Parker.

 

[Khornet]

St Johns,

for what purpose are you writing this? For school, or publication, or just for the love of it?

My impression of the 'nub' of this piece, the overall take-home message, is that one must judge a man's decision in terms of what was known at the time, what data he had to work with, and what a reasonable man would have done with it. And that things weren't as clear-cut at the time as we see them now, knowing more fully what Hitler really was. And that we must keep in mind that the overall mood of the British at the time was essential to the emergence of appeasement. That, exhausted by the first war, England and indeed much of Europe -AND the USA- just didn't have it in them to confront Hitler when it was most easily done.

In all these I think you are right.

However, not all men failed to see. Churchill, Eden, and others knew what had to be done. So what was the difference? Character. Chamberlain was foremost a politician, and his appraoch to any situation was to seek a way through without upsetting the applecart--to preserve the political situation. Churchill, although a politician in the sense that it was his career, was not a politician first and foremost, but a man of convictions who expressed them through politics. So when he was confronted with Hitler, the question became "Is this man evil?" Once that question was answered, the rest was obvious: confront him now, and damn the cost, damn the upsetting of the political balance, or we'll have a worse mess later.

Naturally, Churchill's approach was condemned as crude and simple-minded, and he was treated as the unmannered buffoon at the polite party who insisted on blurting out that the hostess had bad breath. Much as a recent American leader has been damned for a simple-minded cowboy, come to think of it.

Finally, I would remark that although few of us can claim that we would have been as prescient and courageous as Churchill, ever since then we have had the lesson of what appeasement brings. So those who practice it now are worse than Chamberlain: the Cold War appeasers of the Soviets, for example.

 

[CZ52GUY]

"A British government might have been in a position, up to a point, to determine how Britain should behave, but it could not control the lobs dropped into its court by Hitler, Mussolini, Gandhi or Roosevelt, to mention but four names.''

The British government and its leadership was 100% responsible for determining its behavior. Was then, still is. No it could not control the lobs thrown at it, but they certainly could control their response to the lobs.

"The efficiency of the airforce and navy in 1940 refutes the denunciation of Chamberlain as irresponsibly reckless."

The defeat of the British and French resulting in the heroic evacuation at Dunkirk refutes Parker's assessment of Chamberlain's "military readiness" score...as does the impact of the Blitz on London whose citizens I'm sure felt so very well protected by the Chamberlain defense team's risk mitigation plans when they failed to neutralize the German threat on the mainland of Europe.

"Peace in our time" turned into bombs-in-my-flat in London.

Again, Chamberlain's policies are subject to the scrutiny of 20-20 hindsight because that was in his job description.

Regards,

CZ52'

 

[Iain]

Khornet - I agree I think Churchill was a man of principle, but also a politician, Chamberlain was a politician who had some principles. His determination to stick to his principles as late as his resignation in May 1940 was his downfall. He believed in the principle of European peace to British advantage.

It's a dissertation for a degree. It is nowhere near publication standard.

I am going to look into what decided Churchill, I kind of seem to think though that it was a huge gamble on his part, and one that paid off rather well. Eden took the same gamble as Prime Minister in 1956 and it backfired.

CZ - I reached some of the same conclusions as you when looking in to the use of the atomic bomb in 1945. I was roundly criticised for judging Truman on hindsight and probably fairly. Can we stay off the A-bomb but add this - who is to say my initial criticisms of Truman and your criticisms of Chamberlain based on hinsight might have something to do with our nationalities?

Chamberlain had placed significant civil defense preparations, the Expeditionary Force was a failure, but the Navy and the Air Force did quite well. We would not have been able to evacuate Dunkirk without significant naval power.

My initial thoughts about Chamberlain were that he was dead wrong and morally wrong to boot. Gilbert and Gott wrote their famous text in 1963, Gilbert then wrote another in 1966, his tone had changed. Most historians tone changed after the release of official papers in the 1980's.

 

[Iain]

Just a quick vaguely related question - is my writing ok? Does it have a bit of style or is it like reading a pizza menu? Sentences makes sense and train of thought apparent?

I seriously regret doing a History degree, think I may be should have done an English Literature degree. Of course, neither makes me more employable than the other.