This came up in another thread, and so to separate those issues (those of the atomic bomb and appeasement) I thought I would start this thread. It appears that it is a huge issue, some trace the ''feminisation'' of British culture to this point while others argue that it was fundamentally wrong. I have a lot more respect for the second position than the first.
This is the conclusion of a 6,000 word essay I am presently writing about the policies of the 1930's towards Hitler. Read and respond in the same manner as it is written. That kind of saves on the whole personal abuse thing.
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Hindsight has judged Chamberlain guilty of the appeasement of the worst regime in history. Chamberlain’s actions after Munich, and during that meeting, have confirmed his guilt in the eyes of many. From that meeting in 1938 he made mistakes in compounded them with a mixture of optimism - of peace and defeatism.
Chamberlain is most often judged on the way his actions look to us now. Certainly Eden never forgot the way appeasement came to look after 1930, possibly a major cause of his hasty actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Chamberlain was considering peace and not placing the country on a full war footing right up until the power of his administration was broken by Kingsley Wood and others in May 1940. In the light of more complete knowledge of the scope and scale of the ‘achievements’ of the Nazi regime, and the failure of Chamberlain to properly respond to the outbreak of war, Chamberlain’s policy prior to Munich began to look like that of a coward, a fool or a weakling.
Had Chamberlains actions been successful, had a war between Britain and Germany been avoided, then Chamberlain would be remembered with Gandhi as one of the most successful advocates of peace in human history. This ignores the realities of Hitlerian Germany, realities that made Chamberlain unlikely to succeed. He was even open to an application for peace from Germany after the outbreak of war. By now he was decided; “He [Hitler] must either die, or go to St. Helena†(Gilbert and Gott. 1963. pp. 346). There is a marked lack of reality to modern eyes in this hope, and increasingly Chamberlain was becoming distant from political and public opinion by this point, and it led to his downfall. By 1939 Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons that:
We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi government. As long as that government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe. (UE. pp.247)
Prior to 1939 however, Chamberlain was very much in line with public opinion. There was much, and still is much, criticism of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the later Locarno Pact. This treaty led to a demilitarised Rhineland, and Germany split by a Polish area of land that gave Poland access to the sea and control of Danzig. There were strict limitations on German military power and the German economy was arguably stifled by the reparation repayments demanded. By the 1930’s many members of the British public and press felt that the Treaty of Versailles had gone too far and blamed the French for this. Too often critics of appeasement have blamed Chamberlain for conceding to German in 1936 and after, and simultaneously blamed Britain and France for the harsh terms of Versailles. Some might agree that Chamberlain’s actions over the Rhineland and German rearmament were carried out in the light of the widely held belief that Versailles was too draconian.
Chamberlain is damned in the popular memory for his failure to stand up to the tyrant that Hitler was. The Nazi anti-Semitic policies and their repercussions, such as Kristallnacht, were known. Anti-Semitism was not exclusive to Germany at this time. In fact some attribute the fall of Hore-Belisha as Minister of War in 1940 to the fact that he was Jewish. Wedgwood had to tell the Commons on January the 16th “The Prime Minister denies that the Secretary of State was dismissed because he was a Jew. He cannot deny that the prejudice against him was because he was a Jew.†(ibid. pp. 348). Hitler was not the first, nor the last, tyrant to be given free reign by many in the international community. Britain was not the first, nor the last country to fail to fulfil the spirit of its obligations and treaties to another country like it did to Czechoslovakia. Churchill was nearly a lone voice when he said of T. E. Lawrence: “In Colonel Lawrence we have lost one of the greatest beings of our time…I hoped to see him quit his retirement and take a commanding part in the dangers now facing this country.†Churchill was out of government and out on a limb during most of the 1930s. His actions over India and his parliamentary habits had not endeared him to many. He nearly lost the support of his constituency in 1938 when he “assailed the ‘Prince of Peace’, as Chamberlain temporarily appeared to most local Conservativesâ€. (Jenkins. 2001. pp.530) Gilbert and Gott wrote in the first page of the ‘Acknowledgements’ of their classic “The Appeasers†written in 1963:
We have been inspired by the example of Englishmen who refused to be bullied by Nazi bombast…who determined to stand up to that bully…and who urged England not to compromise with evil…We owe a special debt to these men, who by their example, convinced us of the need to tell this sad story of British weakness, not haltingly, but forthrightly. For it is also a story of British strength in the end; of the defeat of appeasement; of the triumph of honour.
However Keith Robbins writes “Appeasement was not a ‘success’ long enough to allow contemporaries to praise its merits in any depth…there were some [contemporary] historians who believed that government policy was broadly on the right lines†(Robbins. 1988. pp1) Herein is the difficulty that faces those who wish to establish the merits of appeasement. The judgement made by many is made in the light of events that occurred after 1939-40, those events being the defeat of the allies that led to Dunkirk, the Holocaust, the triumphant allied victory that led to the end of the Nazi regime and others. It is easy to see pure evil in action when watching the Nuremberg speeches on television now. At the time however it was not so obvious.
The actions of the British Government over the Rhineland, the Anschluss and even Czechoslovakia were thought by some to actually increase the likelihood of peace in Europe. Now those events are seen as evidence of Hitler’s belligerence, at the time they were seen as a shift in the balance of European power, and not necessarily an unwelcome one. Apart from germanophobes such as Vansittart, many saw Germany as Britain’s natural European ally and blamed France for its pitiful state. The aggressiveness of its government, and some of that government’s internal policies, were not welcome, but were seen as a sort of “youthful exuberance†that would calm down as the regime matured.
Failure to prepare is another charge often laid it Chamberlain’s door. Britain was not on a full war footing by 1940, but to attribute that entirely to Chamberlain is not entirely accurate. Kingsley Wood consisted asked for more money in his role as Secretary of State for Air, Simon told him that ‘such spending might lead to inflation, “a rise in prices, in wages, in interest rates†and involve “some real injury to our financial strength.â€â€™
Allowing Germany its claims over the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland and colonies without war was thought a way to redress wrongs, restore Germany, to avoid the break up of the British Empire, but most importantly: to avoid another European war. It is easy to see how this fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the Nazis, Hitler and their ambitions. Who understands that regime even now?
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Any proof reading posts are also welcome, I have cut and paste this straight from Word.
This is the conclusion of a 6,000 word essay I am presently writing about the policies of the 1930's towards Hitler. Read and respond in the same manner as it is written. That kind of saves on the whole personal abuse thing.
--------------
Hindsight has judged Chamberlain guilty of the appeasement of the worst regime in history. Chamberlain’s actions after Munich, and during that meeting, have confirmed his guilt in the eyes of many. From that meeting in 1938 he made mistakes in compounded them with a mixture of optimism - of peace and defeatism.
Chamberlain is most often judged on the way his actions look to us now. Certainly Eden never forgot the way appeasement came to look after 1930, possibly a major cause of his hasty actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Chamberlain was considering peace and not placing the country on a full war footing right up until the power of his administration was broken by Kingsley Wood and others in May 1940. In the light of more complete knowledge of the scope and scale of the ‘achievements’ of the Nazi regime, and the failure of Chamberlain to properly respond to the outbreak of war, Chamberlain’s policy prior to Munich began to look like that of a coward, a fool or a weakling.
Had Chamberlains actions been successful, had a war between Britain and Germany been avoided, then Chamberlain would be remembered with Gandhi as one of the most successful advocates of peace in human history. This ignores the realities of Hitlerian Germany, realities that made Chamberlain unlikely to succeed. He was even open to an application for peace from Germany after the outbreak of war. By now he was decided; “He [Hitler] must either die, or go to St. Helena†(Gilbert and Gott. 1963. pp. 346). There is a marked lack of reality to modern eyes in this hope, and increasingly Chamberlain was becoming distant from political and public opinion by this point, and it led to his downfall. By 1939 Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons that:
We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi government. As long as that government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe. (UE. pp.247)
Prior to 1939 however, Chamberlain was very much in line with public opinion. There was much, and still is much, criticism of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the later Locarno Pact. This treaty led to a demilitarised Rhineland, and Germany split by a Polish area of land that gave Poland access to the sea and control of Danzig. There were strict limitations on German military power and the German economy was arguably stifled by the reparation repayments demanded. By the 1930’s many members of the British public and press felt that the Treaty of Versailles had gone too far and blamed the French for this. Too often critics of appeasement have blamed Chamberlain for conceding to German in 1936 and after, and simultaneously blamed Britain and France for the harsh terms of Versailles. Some might agree that Chamberlain’s actions over the Rhineland and German rearmament were carried out in the light of the widely held belief that Versailles was too draconian.
Chamberlain is damned in the popular memory for his failure to stand up to the tyrant that Hitler was. The Nazi anti-Semitic policies and their repercussions, such as Kristallnacht, were known. Anti-Semitism was not exclusive to Germany at this time. In fact some attribute the fall of Hore-Belisha as Minister of War in 1940 to the fact that he was Jewish. Wedgwood had to tell the Commons on January the 16th “The Prime Minister denies that the Secretary of State was dismissed because he was a Jew. He cannot deny that the prejudice against him was because he was a Jew.†(ibid. pp. 348). Hitler was not the first, nor the last, tyrant to be given free reign by many in the international community. Britain was not the first, nor the last country to fail to fulfil the spirit of its obligations and treaties to another country like it did to Czechoslovakia. Churchill was nearly a lone voice when he said of T. E. Lawrence: “In Colonel Lawrence we have lost one of the greatest beings of our time…I hoped to see him quit his retirement and take a commanding part in the dangers now facing this country.†Churchill was out of government and out on a limb during most of the 1930s. His actions over India and his parliamentary habits had not endeared him to many. He nearly lost the support of his constituency in 1938 when he “assailed the ‘Prince of Peace’, as Chamberlain temporarily appeared to most local Conservativesâ€. (Jenkins. 2001. pp.530) Gilbert and Gott wrote in the first page of the ‘Acknowledgements’ of their classic “The Appeasers†written in 1963:
We have been inspired by the example of Englishmen who refused to be bullied by Nazi bombast…who determined to stand up to that bully…and who urged England not to compromise with evil…We owe a special debt to these men, who by their example, convinced us of the need to tell this sad story of British weakness, not haltingly, but forthrightly. For it is also a story of British strength in the end; of the defeat of appeasement; of the triumph of honour.
However Keith Robbins writes “Appeasement was not a ‘success’ long enough to allow contemporaries to praise its merits in any depth…there were some [contemporary] historians who believed that government policy was broadly on the right lines†(Robbins. 1988. pp1) Herein is the difficulty that faces those who wish to establish the merits of appeasement. The judgement made by many is made in the light of events that occurred after 1939-40, those events being the defeat of the allies that led to Dunkirk, the Holocaust, the triumphant allied victory that led to the end of the Nazi regime and others. It is easy to see pure evil in action when watching the Nuremberg speeches on television now. At the time however it was not so obvious.
The actions of the British Government over the Rhineland, the Anschluss and even Czechoslovakia were thought by some to actually increase the likelihood of peace in Europe. Now those events are seen as evidence of Hitler’s belligerence, at the time they were seen as a shift in the balance of European power, and not necessarily an unwelcome one. Apart from germanophobes such as Vansittart, many saw Germany as Britain’s natural European ally and blamed France for its pitiful state. The aggressiveness of its government, and some of that government’s internal policies, were not welcome, but were seen as a sort of “youthful exuberance†that would calm down as the regime matured.
Failure to prepare is another charge often laid it Chamberlain’s door. Britain was not on a full war footing by 1940, but to attribute that entirely to Chamberlain is not entirely accurate. Kingsley Wood consisted asked for more money in his role as Secretary of State for Air, Simon told him that ‘such spending might lead to inflation, “a rise in prices, in wages, in interest rates†and involve “some real injury to our financial strength.â€â€™
Allowing Germany its claims over the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland and colonies without war was thought a way to redress wrongs, restore Germany, to avoid the break up of the British Empire, but most importantly: to avoid another European war. It is easy to see how this fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the Nazis, Hitler and their ambitions. Who understands that regime even now?
--------------
Any proof reading posts are also welcome, I have cut and paste this straight from Word.