Regarding Vermont, most of their self defense law is apparently from common law, Mitch Vilos in his Self Defense Law of All 50 States provides a bit better guide than Branca for that. State v. Hatcher, 706 A. 2d. 429, 435 (1997) is the more recent case, "As for the duty to retreat, the court instructed that if defendant honestly and reasonably believed "it was immediately necessary to use deadly force to protect himself from an imminent threat of death or bodily injury, the law does not require him to retreat." Thus the jury could have acquitted on the basis of self-defense even if it found that defendant failed to exercise an opportunity to retreat." This is a reiteration of the 1917 Vermont Supreme Court case of State v. Albano, 102 A. 334, 335 (1917). Both Hatcher and Albano deal with failed appeals of convictions where self-defense was raised in part of the shotgun (multiple issues raised in the appeal) appeals of alleged trial errors. This means the Vt. Supreme Court gave perfunctory attention to the self defense arguments as part of broader appeals for a variety of issues raised by the convicted appellant.
I checked Branca's 3rd edition and Vermont does not apparently have a castle doctrine. (see page 225). Part of the reason is that Vermont's Supreme Court has not updated some really old self-defense precedents--neither the Vermont Bar's pattern of jury instructions
http://vtjuryinstructions.org/?page_id=607 has any mention of retreat or the duty to do so but instead has this language, "Whether (Def)_______________’s actions were justified as self-defense depends upon whether it
reasonably appeared to [him] [her] that it was necessary to use the force that [he] [she] actually used. " and this from the instructions regarding where a homicide occurs, " A person in that situation has the right to use only such force as is
reasonably necessary to repel the attack."
From this 1891 case, State v. Roberts, 63 Vt. 119 (1891), the court said this,
"5. The respondents claim that they acted in self-defense, and requests 6, 7, and 8 had relation to the law upon that subject. The error complained of is that under the charge the right of the respondent to defend himself was taken away if he in fact had the means of escape, whether they were apparent to him or not.
To justify one assailed in taking life it must be apparent to him that he has no means of escape. If he has means of escape, but they are unknown to him, if he does not know that he can avail himself of them, he is justified in defending himself by force from the apparent danger he is in. This, we understand, was the rule laid down by the court below { Editorial, the Sup. Ct. of Vt. is discussing the jury instructions by the trial judge in the following sentence.}.
The judge said:
“When a person is unlawfully assaulted by another, the party assaulted has a right to defend himself and to use sufficient force to make his defense effectual. But the law never permits the unnecessary use of force. Therefore, when a man is attacked he must not use force to defend himself if he can otherwise protect himself. If he has other means or ways of avoiding the assault that appear to him at the time sufficient and available and that are in fact sufficient and available, he must resort to them, and cannot justify the use of force for his defense, for in that case its use would be unnecessary.” And what follows is in the same line, viz.: “Perhaps you cannot judge of the act altogether, as it now seems to you. It should not be judged of wholly in the light of what, in looking back upon it, you can see, in cool thought, Roberts might have done differently. But, assuming his claim to be true, in the situation he claims he was in, in the time he had to think and act, were there means to have escaped, or means that to him then seemed available for escape? If not, then he had a right to use means sufficient to protect himself from harm, and if he used no more force than was necessary, or at the time seemed to him necessary, then he is not responsible for the consequences. And if he saw no available means of escape, *426 or of disarming his assailant, and was obliged to resist Walder's assault with force, in order to protect himself,” etc.
It is claimed that the following words in the latter part of the charge, “Were there means to have escaped, or means that to him then seemed available for escape?” are inconsistent with what goes before, and conveyed a different meaning. It might have been plainer if the conjunctive “and” had been used in the place of “or,” but we think the sense and meaning of the expression, taken in connection with the rest of the charge, was the same as though it had been. It was not. If he had means of escape he could not defend himself,
but if he had means of escape, i. e., such means as the judge had been speaking of, means of escape that seemed to him available, then, and in that event only, was he obliged to retreat.
Under the circumstances, no ruling by the Vt. Sup. Ct. as far as a Westlaw search mentions a castle doctrine, nor any special rules for the home, vehicle, or business. In fact, an tort case dealing with an intentional infliction of emotional distress that was defended by a self defense claim (road superintendant used a horsewhip and dragged a woman apparently trying to defend her property from an alleged trespass). Despite the law permitting the road construction on the property in question, the self defense claim to the intentional tort was rejected by the court as using unreasonable force. This would tend to shade any claims of stand your ground as invalid in the state. But, both Roberts and Foss are really old cases.