Leatherneck
Member
I could have sworn I remember some recent discussion on this, but I'll be darned if I can find the thread. Here's a Washington Times article, along with some update from one of the guys in my shop.
On one side of the argument is ARL/SLAD/WMRD who historically have used the estimated kinetic energy (EKE) methodology (which is an assessment of ballistic gelatin using dynamic metrics (high speed photography - major dimensions of temporary wound cavity, striking yaw angle, and other metrics)) to assess wounding potential.
On the other side is ARDEC Picatinny, Navy, Marine Corps, FBI, combat surgeons, and others who support a static assessment of ballistic gelatin taking into account neck length (distance traveled before significant yaw), permanent cavity deformation, total depth of penetration, largest fragment recovered, and other metrics.
Most of the analysis and testing results indicate that shot placement far outweighs the minor terminal ballistic performance differences among the 5.56mm rounds and the M80 7.62mm rounds that were assessed. The range of performance is broad largely due to striking yaw angle, muzzle velocity, and other factors. Striking yaw is unique to the individual weapon as well as to the individual round for each shot.
Based on the testing/analysis conducted during this effort, none of the candidates tested possessed significant across-the-board performance factors that would warrant a switch from M855 as the standard issue, general purpose cartridge for Close Quarters Battle engagements. This conclusion may be less applicable to special operations units due to differences in training, weapon systems, tactics and operational tempo.
The Washington Times writers seem to have added their own conclusions. This line in particular stands out: "The Army study concluded almost the same thing but failed to identify one fault of its own soldiers: They need more training to be better shots." We didn't FAIL to identify that fault; we recognized that human nature in the heat of battle shrouded in the fog of war will always produce marginal "marksmanship." It is one of the reasons why the difference between rounds is negligible.
TC
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
June 16, 2006
Inside the Ring
By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough
Army ammo
The Army recently concluded a $3 million, three-year study to find out what it was told by a group of specialists years ago: The killing power of the M-16/M-4 carbine is good for close combat.
The Army study started after some soldiers in Afghanistan claimed that the 62-grain, 5.56 mm round did not have enough stopping power to kill terrorists in close combat. The complaints appeared aimed at trying to get the Army to adopt bigger caliber guns and ammo, something the service opposes.
According to defense officials close to the study, a group of assembled specialists on the matter, including both ballistics specialists and medical doctors familiar with bullet wounds, told the Army before it started the study that the problem is not the size of the bullet but the person pulling the trigger.
The specialists concluded that disabling an enemy combatant with an M-16 is more dependent on where a shot is placed, the number of hits that are placed on target, and the level of marksmanship training of the solider. The size of the bullet and its design are less important and the standard M855 ammunition, known as "green tip" ammo is fine.
The Army study concluded almost the same thing but failed to identify one fault of its own soldiers: They need more training to be better shots.
The study proved that the complaints from some units in Afghanistan were unwarranted. "There are some special operations units that never complained because they could shoot," one official told us. For those lacking marksmanship training, "they could shoot at someone 10 times but only hit him once or twice."
"The Army is very willing to spend a lot of money on guns and ammunition, but very little on marksmanship training," the official said.
On one side of the argument is ARL/SLAD/WMRD who historically have used the estimated kinetic energy (EKE) methodology (which is an assessment of ballistic gelatin using dynamic metrics (high speed photography - major dimensions of temporary wound cavity, striking yaw angle, and other metrics)) to assess wounding potential.
On the other side is ARDEC Picatinny, Navy, Marine Corps, FBI, combat surgeons, and others who support a static assessment of ballistic gelatin taking into account neck length (distance traveled before significant yaw), permanent cavity deformation, total depth of penetration, largest fragment recovered, and other metrics.
Most of the analysis and testing results indicate that shot placement far outweighs the minor terminal ballistic performance differences among the 5.56mm rounds and the M80 7.62mm rounds that were assessed. The range of performance is broad largely due to striking yaw angle, muzzle velocity, and other factors. Striking yaw is unique to the individual weapon as well as to the individual round for each shot.
Based on the testing/analysis conducted during this effort, none of the candidates tested possessed significant across-the-board performance factors that would warrant a switch from M855 as the standard issue, general purpose cartridge for Close Quarters Battle engagements. This conclusion may be less applicable to special operations units due to differences in training, weapon systems, tactics and operational tempo.
The Washington Times writers seem to have added their own conclusions. This line in particular stands out: "The Army study concluded almost the same thing but failed to identify one fault of its own soldiers: They need more training to be better shots." We didn't FAIL to identify that fault; we recognized that human nature in the heat of battle shrouded in the fog of war will always produce marginal "marksmanship." It is one of the reasons why the difference between rounds is negligible.
TC