sharpsdressedman said:
If not, then cite some REAL examples of cartridge failure.
Plenty of references out there if you're not wearing blinders. How many do you want? Took about 10 seconds to find the list of references below:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1_carbine
However, negative reports began to surface with airborne operations in Sicily in 1943,[12] and increased during the fall and winter of 1944.[13]
Other soldiers and marines engaged in frequent daily firefights (particularly those serving in the Philippines) found the weapon to have insufficient stopping power and penetration.[15][16] Reports of the carbine's failure to stop enemy soldiers, sometimes after multiple hits, appeared in individual after-action reports, postwar evaluations, and service histories of both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.[15][17] Aware of these shortcomings, the U.S. Army, its Pacific Command Ordnance staff, and the Aberdeen small arms facility continued to work on shortened versions of the M1 rifle throughout the war, though none was ever officially adopted.
A 1951 official U.S. Army evaluation of scores of individual after-action combat reports for all small arms usage in Korea by the Eighth Army from 1 November 1950 to 1 March 1951 documented the weapon's cold-weather shortcomings, as well as noting complaints from individual soldiers that the carbine bullet failed to stop heavily clothed[30][31][32][33] or gear-laden[34][35][36] North Korean and Chinese (PVA) troops at close range after multiple hits.[26][28][37] Soldiers reported that their "reaction to the weapons family was almost universally to the point that what they have is good and adequate to the tactical need...The one exception was the carbine.
One company in the 38th Infantry Regiment expressed its satisfaction with this weapon; but it was alone in the Eighth Army. In all other units, bad experience in battle had made troops shy of this weapon."[38] Marines of the 1st Marine Division also reported instances of carbine bullets failing to stop enemy soldiers, and some units issued standing orders for carbine users to aim for the head.[39][40] Ironically, PVA infantry forces who had been issued captured U.S. small arms disliked the carbine for the same reason.[41]
References:
12) Gavin, James M. (Lt. Gen.), War and Peace in the Space Age, New York: Harper and Brothers (1958), pp. 57, 63: Col. Gavin's love affair with his M1A1 carbine ended in Sicily, when his carbine and that of Maj. Vandervoort jammed repeatedly. Noticing that carbine fire rarely suppressed rifle fire from German infantry, he and Vandervoort traded with wounded soldiers for their M1 rifles and ammunition; Gavin carried an M1 rifle for the rest of the war.
13) Burgett, Donald, Seven Roads To Hell, New York: Dell Publishing (1999), ISBN 0-440-23627-4 pp. 153-154: Burgett, a machine-gunner in the 101st Airborne from Normandy to the Battle of the Bulge, witnessed several failures of the .30 carbine to stop German soldiers after being hit.
15) Dunlap, Roy, Ordnance Went Up Front, Samworth Press (1948), p. 297
16) McManus, John C., The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II, New York: Random House Publishing, ISBN 0-89141-823-7 (1998), p. 52: Private Richard Lovett of the U.S. Americal Division noted that "It didn't have stopping power. Enemy soldiers were shot many times but kept on coming."
17) McManus, John C., The Deadly Brotherhood, p. 52
26) Canfield, Bruce, Arms of the Chosin Few American Rifleman, 2 November 2010, retrieved 10 May 2011
28) S.L.A. Marshall, Commentary on Infantry and Weapons in Korea 1950-51, 1st Report ORO-R-13 of 27 October 1951, Project Doughboy [Restricted], Operations Research Office (ORO), U.S. Army (1951)
30) O'Donnell, Patrick, Give Me Tomorrow: The Korean War's Greatest Untold Story: The Epic Stand of the Marines of George Company, Da Capo Press 1st ed., ISBN 0-306-81801-9, ISBN 978-0-306-81801-1 (2010), p. 88, 168, 173
31) Clavin, Tom, Last Stand of Fox Company, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, ISBN 0-87113-993-6, ISBN 978-0-87113-993-1 (2009), p. 113: In addition to their bulky cotton-padded telegroika coats, which could freeze solid with perspiration, Chicom infantry frequently wore vests or undercoats of thick goatskin.
32) Jowett, Philip S., The Chinese Army 1937-49: World War II and Civil War, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-84176-904-2 (2005), p. 47
33) Thomas, Nigel, The Korean War 1950-53, Osprey Publishing Ltd., ISBN 0-85045-685-1, ISBN 978-0-85045-685-1 (1986), p. 47
34) Andrew, Martin (Dr.), Logistics in the PLA, Army Sustainment, Vol. 42, Issue 2, March–April 2010
35) Thomas, Nigel, The Korean War 1950-53, Osprey Publishing Ltd., ISBN 0-85045-685-1, ISBN 978-0-85045-685-1 (1986), pp. 37, 47: Many Chinese troops carried either rice or shaoping, an unleavened bread flour mixture in a fabric tube slung over the shoulder.
36) Chinese troops frequently wore bandolier-type ammunition pouches and carried extra PPsh or Thompson magazines in addition to 4-5 stick grenades.
37) Russ, Martin, Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign: Korea 1950, Penguin Publishing, ISBN 0-14-029259-4, ISBN 978-0-14-029259-6 (2000), p. 40
39) Clavin, Tom, Last Stand of Fox Company, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, ISBN 0-87113-993-6, ISBN 978-0-87113-993-1 (2009), pp. 82, 113
40) O'Donnell, Patrick, Give Me Tomorrow: The Korean War's Greatest Untold Story, p. 88
41) Spurr, Russell, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51, New York, NY: Newmarket Press, ISBN 978-1-55704-914-8 (1998), p.182: Chinese frontline PLA troops disliked the M1/M2 carbine, as they believed its cartridge had inadequate stopping power. Captured U.S. carbines were instead issued to runners and mortar crews.