So evidently the war caused Holmes to believe the dangers were not as remote as they were, but that they were "clear and present." In retrospect, he saw how remote the actual dangers were. Similarly, the events in El Paso and Dayton caused some to see the danger in Missouri as clear and present, but in retrospect, we can see how remote the danger was when all those people were visiting Starbucks with their AR's and guns-n-coffee stickers.
The whole background behind Schenk is that a guy (believe that he was a Socialist Wobblie (IWW member)) was part of a group mailing out pamphlets to urge new recruits to desert during WWI. Eugene Debs, as in Debs v. United States, was also caught up in a violation of the rather draconian Espionage Act of 1917 (elements of which are still law today.). This is also conflated with Gitlow v. NY which was a post war case dealing with NY's criminal anarchy law (garden variety Communism today) by participating in writing a manifesto modeled on the infamous Communist Manifesto. Gitlow argued since his actions other than speech were not actually attempting a violent overthrow of the government, that they were protected. In all three cases, the Supreme Court declared that a right to free speech existed but not for these particular defendants. The clear and present danger test is still around in modified form along with the bad tendency test--Brandenburg is an example of the first, and Chaplinksy with its fighting words is an example of the latter free speech test. So far, that is why hate speech per se, is still considered protected speech as a content category but not necessarily when coupled with actions--as an element of a hate crime for example that involves actions plus speech.
In this case, from the facts so far which could change, it appears that the individual in question did a series of actions that could be easily construed by a judge and jury to constitute violating MO law that combats terror. Thus, the MO law is content neutral, which unlike RAV v. St. Paul, addresses anyone's ACTIONS that could constitute elements of a crime and any resulting affect on speech is incidental. Thus, it is facially constitutional. Then the court will have to deal with whether it was unconstitutionally applied in the defendant's case. This is what separates the accused's actions from a garden variety protest, even one with firearms.
FWIW, Georgia used to have a quaint law called a public gathering law that banned firearms (despite allowing open carry) from a "public gathering" including political functions. One of the reasons that the state legislature eventually changed it was the vague definition of public gathering could include peaceful protests protected by the First Amendment and could have been applied to even meetings among friends that were legally armed but in combination would constitute an illegal "public gathering". Needless to say, it was applied when the local authorities wanted it applied and not when they did.
Thus, it was aimed at restricting some speech in practice that was not in accord with the public and the law was just vague enough to pass GA constitutional muster for years. Unfortunately, many of those individuals charged under the law were African Americans seeking to protect their lives, property, and their political rights who justly did not feel safe without having arms to protect themselves.
http://www.georgiacarry.org/cms/geo...on-the-bloody-legacy-of-the-camilla-massacre/